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SECOND AMENDMENT DECISION RULES, 
NON-LETHAL WEAPONS, AND SELF-
DEFENSE 
General public debate about the Second Amendment has focused 
almost exclusively on the regulation of firearms.  After Heller and 
McDonald, the scope of the Second Amendment’s protection has been 
hotly contested.  One area of the Second Amendment that has been less 
discussed is the decisional rules that would govern non-firearms and 
levels of protection based on location.  This Comment proposes two 
Second Amendment Constitutional decisional rules.  Broadly, this 
Comment suggests that the “common use” test for “arms” should be 
modified for the development of new arms, such as non-lethal weapons, 
that are subject to the Second Amendment.  The proposed “common use 
for the self-defense purpose” test attempts to add more precision by tying 
the weapon to the individual right to self-defense.  Second, this Comment 
argues that a decisional rule that adjusts for location and arm type will 
comport with the objectives of the Second Amendment, i.e., self-defense, 
and provide an additional means for self-defense outside the home.  This 
argument is supported by Court precedent and practical objectives that 
increase the ability of individuals to defend themselves outside the home 
and simultaneously attempt to decrease the lethality of these 
confrontations. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
December 14, 2012, started off like any other day for the parents of 
the 458 children enrolled at Sandy Hook Elementary.1  As scheduled in 
the school’s recently updated emergency protocols, the front entry doors 
were closed and locked at 9:30 a.m.2  Twenty-year-old Adam Lanza had 
just left his house, where he had shot his mother in the head four times.3  
Lanza then drove to Sandy Hook Elementary equipped with his 
mother’s Bushmaster XM15-E2S rifle,4 fired through the locked entry 
doors to gain access to the building, and preceded to fire 152 rounds at 
 
1. Enrollment Report as of November 30, 2012, NEWTOWN PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT 
(Feb. 1, 2013), http://www.newtown.k12.ct.us/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=Ka95L6cIbcU%3d&t
abid=3295&mid=39347. 
2. James Barron, Gunman Massacres 20 Children at School in Connecticut; 28 Dead, 
Including Killer, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2012, at A1 (reporting that the school district changed 
the security policy earlier in the year); Kate Hartman, School Security Remains a Priority 
Since Newtown Shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary, REG. CITIZEN (Aug. 27, 2013), 
http://www.registercitizen.com/general-news/20130827/school-security-remains-a-priority-sinc 
e-newtown-shooting-at-sandy-hook-elementary. 
3. Barron, supra note 2; Ashley Fantz, Shooter’s Mother Wanted Her Son to Fit In, 
Friend Says, CNN.COM (Dec. 21, 2012, 12:43 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/16/us/connecti
cut-nancy-lanza-profile. 
4. Press Release, Conn. State Police, State Police Identify Weapons Used in Sandy 
Hook Investigation; Investigation Continues (Jan. 18, 2013), available at http://www.ct.gov/de
spp/cwp/view.asp?Q=517284&A=4226; Barron, supra note 2. 
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the children and staff.5  In less than five minutes,6 Lanza left a trail of 
carnage that resulted in the deaths of twenty-six innocent people, 
including twenty children and six school staff.7  Upon learning that the 
police had arrived, Lanza took his own life with a pistol.8  Twenty-six 
more lives had been added to the recent string of active-shooter mass 
shootings,9 and these deaths add to the 32,163 gun-related deaths in 
2011.10 
Annual homicide rates in the United States have gone up and down 
since 1995, but hover around 15,953 per year, with rates of homicide per 
100,000 people down by half since 1993.11  In 2011, there were a total of 
11,101 gun homicides, accounting for almost 70% of all homicides in the 
United States.12  Additionally, 851 individuals died unintentionally at the 
hands of guns.13  The seriousness of homicide and deaths by guns in the 
 
5. See Dave Altimari et al., Lanza Studied Mass Murders: Researched Multiple Killers, 
HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 14, 2013, at A1. 
6. Susan Candiotti et al., Newtown Shooting Details Revealed in Newly Released 
Documents, CNN.COM (Mar. 29, 2013, 9:53 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/28/us/connectic
ut-shooting-documents/; see also Rich Scinto & Luther Turmelle, Newtown Shooting: An 
Interactive Timeline of Events, NEW HAVEN REG. (Dec. 15, 2012), http://www.nhregister.com
/articles/2012/12/16/news/doc50cd04641ce4f908399785.txt. 
7. Barron, supra note 2 (reporting that twenty of the twenty-six people killed were 
children); Scinto & Turmelle, supra note 6. 
8. See Altimari et al., supra note 5. 
9. See Mark Follman et al., A Guide to Mass Shootings in America, MOTHER JONES 
(July 20, 2012, 6:32 PM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/07/mass-shootings-map 
(reporting that there have been at least sixty-two mass shootings since 1982—including 
several shootings in 2012: Colorado theatre, Wisconsin Sikh temple, and Minnesota 
manufacturer, among others).  While the Guide to Mass Shootings includes statistics on how 
often the killer obtained a weapon legally, these statistics seem to misrepresent the claim 
because, for instance, it claims Adam Lanza’s weapons were obtained legally, see id., 
suggesting to the reader that he went out and purchased the weapons legally, when in fact, the 
weapons were purchased by his mother and he took and used them.  Caroline Bankoff, 
Newtown Shooter Adam Lanza’s Mother Was an Avid Gun Collector, N.Y. MAG. (Dec. 16, 
2012, 10:35 AM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2012/12/adam-lanzas-mother-was-an-
avid-gun-collector.html; Fantz, supra note 3.  So, technically, the weapons were purchased 
legally but were obtained by Adam Lanza without permission.  See Follman et al., supra. 
10. See Philip Alpers et al., Guns in the United States: Total Number of Gun Deaths, 
GUNPOLICY.ORG, http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/compareyears/194/total_number_of_gu
n_deaths (last visited Jan. 29, 2014). 
11. See DONNA L. HOYERT & JIAQUAN XU, U.S. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, 61 
NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP. NO. 6, DEATHS: PRELIMINARY DATA FOR 2011, at 19 tbl.2 (2012); 
Gun Homicide Rate Declines By Half Since 1993 Peak, PEW RES. SOC. & DEMOGRAPHIC 
TRENDS (May 2, 2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/05/07/gun-violence-in-america/s 
t_13-05-02_ss_guncrimes_02_murder-rate/. 
12. See HOYERT & XU, supra note 11, at 19 tbl.2. 
13. Id. at 18 tbl.2. 
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country cannot be underestimated, nor should the problem be swept 
under the rug. 
To illustrate the significance of guns in the United States, current 
estimates put the total number of guns owned by civilians in the United 
States at around 270 million.14  The United States has the highest rate of 
private ownership of firearms at 88.8 per 100 people, making it higher 
than Yemen, Iraq, and Afghanistan.15  Additionally, it would take the 
next ninety-two countries, by highest rate of ownership per weapons 
combined, to hit 255 million firearms owned by citizens.16  China, taking 
the position of 102, has 4.9 weapons per 100 people and a grand total of 
40 million weapons.17  The United States purchases roughly 4.5 million 
of the 8 million new guns manufactured worldwide.18 
These statistics are not meant to show that guns should be banned or 
that they should not be sold—by contrast, the statistics show three 
valuable things: (1) that individuals need to be better trained on storing 
and using guns; (2) that high numbers of weapons correlate to a high 
number of gun-related deaths; and (3) that other alternatives to guns 
should be explored in an effort to curb gun-related violence and death. 
By comparison, the statistics for the number of civilian-purchased, 
non-lethal weapons are not as clear as the statistics for lethal weapons 
purchases.  Civilian purchases of tasers numbered 198,000 as late as 
2009.19  Because more than one company sells irritant sprays, little 
numerical data exists on irritant spray sales numbers; however, a recent 
article estimates that there may be at least 600,000 people who possess 
irritant sprays.20  The rate of death by stun guns is substantially lower, 
 
14. See Aaron Karp, Completing the Count: Civilian Firearms, in SMALL ARMS SURVEY 
2007: GUNS AND THE CITY 39, 39 (2007). 
15. Id. at Annexe 4 (per 100 civilians: Yemen at 54.8; Iraq at 34.2, Afghanistan at 4.4). 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Laura MacInnis, U.S. Most Armed Country with 90 Guns Per 100 People, REUTERS 
(Aug. 28, 2007), http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/08/28/us-world-firearms-idUSL28348938 
20070828 (citing Karp, supra note 14, at 46). 
19. Eugene Volokh, Nonlethal Self-Defense, (Almost Entirely) Nonlethal Weapons, and 
the Rights to Keep and Bear Arms and Defend Life, 62 STAN. L. Rev. 199, 201 & n.6 (2009) 
[hereinafter Volokh, Nonlethal Self-Defense] (citing Elizabeth Zavala, Tasers Gain 
Widespread Acceptance, but Tarrant Sheriff Is Rare Holdout, FORT WORTH STAR-
TELEGRAM, Oct. 11, 2009, at B1). 
20. Volokh, Nonlethal Self-Defense, supra note 19, at 201 n.6.  As Professor Volokh 
notes, this number was based on the 12,804 active irritant spray licenses in the state of 
Massachusetts as of July 15, 2009, and extrapolated over the entire population.  Id.  This 
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“no more than 0.01% per use.”21  Conversely, the rate of death for 
gunshot victims in deliberate attacks is about 20% and the rate of death 
for knife attack victims in deliberate attacks is 2%.22 
In light of the horrific massacre at Sandy Hook Elementary,23 
divergent solutions to the problem of gun violence generally, and gun 
violence in schools specifically, have been proposed.24  Unfortunately, 
both sides of the debate neglect to raise the use of non-lethal weapons 
as a deterrent to violent crime, which can simultaneously decrease the 
use of guns and increase an individual’s ability to defend himself.25  The 
United States Supreme Court, by its decision in District of Columbia v. 
Heller,26 pronounced a “constitutional operative proposition,”27 or 
 
number is likely low because many states allow possession of irritant spray without a license.  
Id. 
21. Eugene Volokh, Older Minors, the Right to Keep and Bear (Almost Entirely) 
Nonlethal Arms, and the Right to Defend Life, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 447, 450 (2011) [hereinafter 
Volokh, Older Minors]; see also infra notes 34–38 and accompanying text. 
22. Volokh, Older Minors, supra note 21, at 450. 
23. See Barron, supra note 2. 
24. Compare THE WHITE HOUSE, NOW IS THE TIME: THE PRESIDENT’S PLAN TO 
PROTECT OUR CHILDREN AND OUR COMMUNITIES BY REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE 2 
(2013), available at www.wh.gov/now-is-the-time (proposing four solutions to reduce gun 
violence: (1) “Closing background check loopholes to keep guns out of dangerous hands”; (2) 
“Banning military-style assault weapons and high-capacity magazines, and taking other 
common-sense steps to reduce gun violence”; (3) “Making schools safer; and” (4) “Increasing 
access to mental health services”), with  Wayne LaPierre, NRA Executive Vice President & 
CEO, NRA Press Conference 7–8 (Dec. 21, 2012) (transcript available at 
http://home.nra.org/pdf/Transcript_PDF.pdf) (arguing that armed police in schools through a 
national armed security program would stem the tide of school shootings).  The divergent 
approaches to gun violence seem to suggest that little progress will be made because neither 
side wants to address the real roots of violent crime, such as socio-economic and cultural 
factors.  See DON B. KATES, JR., GUNS, MURDERS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: A REALISTIC 
ASSESSMENT OF GUN CONTROL 58 (1990) (“The basic determinants of violent crime are 
fundamental socio-cultural, institutional, and economic factors that no gun law can overcome.  
So long as perhaps 1 of every 300 persons who grow up in the United States is inclined toward 
violent crime, our society will be far more violent than either gun-banning England or gun-
loving Switzerland, where only 1 of 30,000 inhabitants is so inclined.”). 
25. See, e.g., Atlanta Woman Uses Stun Gun to Help Officer in Distress, WSB-TV.COM 
(Jan. 26, 2009, 6:23 PM), http://www.wsbtv.com/news/news/atlanta-woman-uses-stun-gun-to-
help-officer-in-dis/nJTqt/. 
26. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
27. See Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2004) 
(stating that a “constitutional operative proposition” represents the Court’s understanding of 
a particular constitutional provision). 
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constitutional rule,28 that the Second Amendment guarantees an 
individual right to keep and bear arms for self-defense.29  While the 
Court offered strikingly little decisional guidance when developing this 
constitutional rule,30 little guidance leaves open room for innovative 
arguments. 
Given the current lack of guidance in how courts are to apply and 
develop Second Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has an 
opportunity to provide clarity and stability for non-lethal weapons that 
can be used in self-defense.  Rarely are rights categorical—most of the 
amendments within the Bill of Rights contain special exceptions31—and 
the Second Amendment should be no different.  Through the 
acceptance of non-lethal weapons as “arms,” a nuanced legal distinction 
between lethal and non-lethal weapons, and a test that provides more or 
 
28. See Calvin Massey, Second Amendment Decision Rules, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1431, 1431 
& n.2 (2009) (citing Berman, supra note 27, at 9) (stating that a “constitutional operative 
proposition” is a “constitutional rule”). 
29. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 636. 
30. See Massey, supra note 28, at 1431.  While the Court provided a new constitutional 
rule in District of Columbia v. Heller, little if any guidance was given on when this right is 
infringed and no constitutional decisional rules were provided regarding the following: 
defining the right; identifying who can assert the right; special circumstances that qualify the 
right; the burden on the right that “constitutes a presumptive infringement of it must be 
articulated”; and the level of scrutiny must be practically “phrased in a useable manner.”  Id. 
(attempting to provide a framework and discussion for the decisional rules that were left out 
of the opinion in Heller). 
31. This can be seen through the exceptions for freedom of speech and association.  See, 
e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513–14 (1969) (expanding 
free speech rights to students in schools, but recognizing that reasonable limitations may be 
placed on that right in certain circumstances); NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 
463–64, 466 (1958) (including the right to keep membership lists private within the freedom of 
association provided by the First Amendment, but suggesting that if the state were able to 
show a substantial and compelling interest in obtaining the lists, the right may be infringed).  
But see Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 132–33 (1977) (ruling that 
prisoners’ First Amendment right of association to join labor unions is outweighed by the 
state’s legitimate objectives).  The Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures also has limited exceptions.  See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 
170, 178–81 (1984) (holding that a field owned by the defendant falls outside of the Fourth 
Amendment’s protection because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the field); 
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (stating that the school environment requires 
the relaxation of some of the Fourth Amendment restrictions that authorities are subject to).  
Additionally, there are certain individuals that have been exempted from the proportionality 
review courts typically undergo when confronted with a freedom from cruel and unusual 
punishment issue under the Eighth Amendment, preventing the execution of these 
individuals regardless of their crime.  See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564, 578 
(2005) (those under eighteen at the time of their crime); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311–
12, 321 (2002) (mentally disabled). 
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less protection of one’s right to bear arms based on location, the Court 
has a unique opportunity to shape the current arms debate in a way that 
will give state lawmakers the flexibility and time needed to address the 
roots of violence while giving lawfully acting citizens an individual right 
to self-defense in a variety of contexts. 
In order to evaluate whether non-lethal weapons are arms and to 
craft the proper test for determining whether a weapon is protected 
under the Second Amendment, this Comment starts by describing what 
non-lethal weapons are and how they work.  Part III walks through 
recent Court history and the Court’s transition from a collective to an 
individual right under the Second Amendment.  Part IV shows that the 
current makeup of different states’ non-lethal-weapons schemes is so 
confusing and unclear that those law-abiding citizens who wish to carry 
non-lethal weapons will likely need to hire an attorney to understand 
the laws, creating an undue burden on those citizens.  Further, this 
Section will show that current federal law does not and should not 
attempt to nationally regulate non-lethal weapons.  Finally, a brief 
proposal will highlight the constitutional decisional rule that should be 
used and the precedential and practical reasons to support such a 
proposal.  While the ideas in this Comment are not entirely novel, taken 
as a whole they suggest an innovative solution that the Court may use to 
help solve a current crisis with a constitutional decisional rule that will 
satisfy both precedential and practical objectives. 
II. NON-LETHAL ARMS DEFINED AND THEIR TYPES 
An analysis of non-lethal weapons and their proper place within the 
Second Amendment is not useful unless an understanding of these 
weapons is established.32  Non-lethal weapons are defined as “[w]eapons 
that are explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate 
personnel or material, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to 
personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment.”33  
 
32. This explanation of types and differences of non-lethal weapons is particularly 
important as there is a common perception among gun-rights advocates that those who 
advocate for tighter gun controls have no substantial knowledge about guns.  Whether this is 
true or not, establishing a common understanding of terms and types will help to reduce 
confusion, increase awareness, and focus on the merits. 
33. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 373 
(2005).  These weapons typically employ a method of incapacitation that does not destroy 
their target and “are intended to have one, or both, of the following characteristics: (1) They 
have relatively reversible effects on personnel or material.  (2) They affect objects differently 
within their area of influence.”  Id.  Interestingly, the U.S. Department of Defense created a 
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Although the definition and name implies that non-lethal weapons are 
never lethal, this is a slight misnomer.34  Non-lethal weapons are 
designed to incapacitate a threat without death and minimize permanent 
damage.35  However, these definitions focus on the intent of the 
weapons, not the actual outcome.36  While the definition is open to 
multiple interpretations and functional differences,37 the characteristics 
that make non-lethal weapons non-lethal are that their effects are 
reversible; the weapons significantly reduce the probability of death and 
permanent injury; and they are intended to deter, disrupt, disorient, and 
deny instead of destroy.38 
The types of non-lethal weapons discussed below are those typically 
 
Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate by Congressional initiative and Department of 
Defense Directive 3000.03E.  See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 3000.03E, POLICY 
FOR NON-LETHAL WEAPONS (2013), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/ 
pdf/300003p.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., JOINT NON-LETHAL WEAPONS DIRECTORATE: NON-
LETHAL WEAPONS REFERENCE BOOK (2011), available at http://www.jnlwp.defense.gov.  
Non-lethal weapons are sometimes called “less lethal weapons.”  See CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 16780 (West 2012) (“‘Less lethal weapon’ means any device that is designed to or that has 
been converted to expel or propel less lethal ammunition by any action, mechanism, or 
process for the purpose of incapacitating, immobilizing, or stunning a human being through 
the infliction of any less than lethal impairment of physical condition, function, or senses, 
including physical pain or discomfort.  It is not necessary that a weapon leave any lasting or 
permanent incapacitation, discomfort, pain, or other injury or disability in order to qualify as 
a less lethal weapon.”). 
34. See, e.g., ACLU OF S. CAL., PEPPER SPRAY: A MAGIC BULLET UNDER SCRUTINY 
27 (1993) (reporting the deaths of seven individuals between January 5 and September 9, 
1993, due to police use of pepper spray); AMNESTY INT’L, USA—STUN WEAPONS IN LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 2 (2008) (reporting that at least 330 individuals died between 2001 and 2008 
after being struck with a taser by police).  Although reports partly minimized the role pepper 
spray played in the deaths, the studies were not conclusive of the role pepper spray played in 
the police-use deaths.  See, e.g., JOHN GRANFIELD ET AL., INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF 
POLICE, PEPPER SPRAY AND IN-CUSTODY DEATHS 3 (1994) (describing studies that suggest 
the results of a series of deaths involving police oleoresin capsicum (OC) use were not 
attributable to the OC); NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OLEORESIN 
CAPSICUM: PEPPER SPRAY AS A FORCE ALTERNATIVE 5 (1994) (explaining the potential for 
death resulting from OC exposure). 
35. ERIK L. NUTLEY, NON-LETHAL WEAPONS: SETTING OUR PHASERS ON STUN? 
POTENTIAL STRATEGIC BLESSINGS AND CURSES OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS ON THE 
BATTLEFIELD 2 (2003). 
36. JOHN L. BARRY ET AL., NON-LETHAL MILITARY MEANS: NEW LEVERAGE FOR A 
NEW ERA 5 (1994); NUTLEY, supra note 35, at 2. 
37. See NUTLEY, supra note 35, at 2.  While this discussion focuses a great deal on non-
lethal weapons from the standpoint of the military, the different types, uses, and pitfalls of 
these weapons from a military perspective can help shed light on different civilian uses and 
can help with figuring out what types of arms fall within the scope of the Second Amendment.  
See discussion infra Part V.A–B. 
38. See NUTLEY, supra note 35, at 3. 
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available as personal self-defense weapons.  Non-lethal weapons that 
are typically available for personal self-defense are determined by three 
factors: cost, access, and ease of use.39  While each of these factors can 
play varied roles in an individual’s decision to purchase and possess 
these weapons, most civilian weapons used for personal self-defense can 
be broken into three main types: blunt force objects, electrical weapons, 
and irritant sprays.40 
 
39. Cost, for instance, may be a high barrier to certain types of acoustic-based weapons 
that could be used by the civilian population.  The Long-Range Acoustic Device (LRAD) can 
target threats with a 95-decibel sound wave (similar to standing next to a train), leaving them 
disoriented, but cost between $20,000 and $30,000 in 2005.  Bruce V. Bigelow, Device Helped 
Thwart Pirates: Sound Waves Are Turned Into Weapon by S.D. Firm, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., Nov. 9, 2005, at C1.  Additionally, access to this original system and its size, thirty-
three inches across and nearly forty-five pounds, make this weapon highly ineffective for 
personal self-defense use.  Id.  However, advances in technology are proving to make these 
weapons more functional in personal ways by decreasing size and costs.  See LRAD 100X 
Long Range Acoustic Device, LRAD CORP., http://www.lradx.com/site/content/view/207/110/ 
(last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (marketing the next LRAD 100X at fourteen inches across and 
fifteen pounds, while producing a 137-decibel sound wave); Pierre Chamberland, Sound 
Cannons, MARK (Jun. 17, 2010), http://pioneers.themarknews.com/articles/1711-sound-
cannons/#.UyH72T9dWSo (reporting the cost of an LRAD 100X at $10,000). 
40. There are many different types of non-lethal weapons currently in use by the U.S. 
military: acoustic, optical, blunt trauma, irritant, and vehicle-stopping.  NAT’L INST. OF 
JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NONLETHAL WEAPONS AND 
EQUIPMENT REVIEW: A RESEARCH GUIDE FOR CIVIL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND 
CORRECTIONS (2004) [hereinafter A RESEARCH GUIDE FOR CIVIL LAW ENFORCEMENT]; 
Non-Lethal Weapons Program: Current Non-Lethal Weapons, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., 
http://jnlwp.defense.gov/CurrentNonLethalWeapons.aspx (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) 
(describing non-lethal weapons, with pictures, used by U.S. military forces and civilian law 
enforcement); Non-Lethal Weapons Program: History, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., 
http://jnlwp.defense.gov/About/History.aspx (last visited Jan. 31, 2014).  However, the 
military’s use of these weapons is governed by a plethora of international treaties, domestic 
law, and policies and regulations.  See, e.g., Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989, 
18 U.S.C. § 175 (2012); Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998, 22 
U.S.C. § 6701 (2012); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-106, § 219, 110 Stat. 186, 223–24; N. ATLANTIC TREATY ORG., NATO POLICY ON NON-
LETHAL WEAPONS (1999); Additional Protocol to the Convention on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be 
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Protocol IV, Entitled Protocol on 
Blinding Laser Weapons), Oct. 13, 1995, T.I.A.S. No. 09-721.2, 2024 U.N.T.S. 167; Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces 
in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed 
Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in the Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 
6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631; U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 
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A. Blunt Force Objects 
Blunt force objects are intended to cause temporary pain or injury 
and can take the form of projectiles, batons, bean-bags, liquid filled 
munitions, and water cannons, among others.41  The most common and 
easy-to-use weapons for self-defense purposes are batons.42  With the 
exception of some projectiles, blunt force objects are some of the oldest 
and most predominantly used non-lethal weapons because they can be 
easily manipulated and are inexpensive.43  Batons come in a variety of 
lengths, designs, and materials.44  They are relatively cheap compared to 
electric weapons and can be purchased at national retailers.45  Some can 
collapse and expand, while others attach to key rings and contain a ball 
at the end to increase the baton’s disabling effects.46  Additionally, 
batons are easily concealable in a pocket, bag, or purse,47 but if used 
improperly, they can cause death or permanent damage.48 
Another type of blunt force object, projectiles, come as bullets or 
 
3000.03, POLICY FOR NON-LETHAL WEAPONS 2 (1996) (defining non-lethal weapons); U.S. 
DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NO. 6055.15, DOD LASER PROTECTION PROGRAM (2007).  
Additionally, certain guidance regarding the rules of engagement, implementation of law of 
war, and guidance using chemical and biological employment of riot control agents and 
herbicides is given to commanders.  See generally, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, COMPENDIUM OF 
CURRENT CJCS DIRECTIVES (2009) (noting, for example, Instructions 3110.07C, 3121.01B 
and 5810.01C).  Although most of these are classified, it is important to note that there is 
guidance in place for the armed forces’ use of these devices.  See id. 
41. See NUTLEY, supra note 35, at 14 tbl.2. 
42. Charlie Mesloh et al., Less Lethal Weapons for Law Enforcement: A Performance 
Based Analysis, 8 L. ENFORCEMENT EXECUTIVE F. 133, 141 (2008); see also WEAPONS & 
PROTECTIVE SYS. TECHS. CTR., A GUIDEBOOK FOR LESS LETHAL DEVICES: PLANNING 
FOR, SELECTING, AND IMPLEMENTING TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS 4-2 (Edward L. Hughes & 
Robert A. Osborne eds., 1st ed. 2010) [hereinafter WEAPONS & PROTECTIVE SYS.], available 
at https://www.justnet.org/pdf/WPSTC-GUIDE-FINAL-%282010.05.07%29-COMPLETE.pd 
f. 
43. See WEAPONS & PROTECTIVE SYS., supra note 42, at 4-2; Personal Defense, 
CABELA’S, http://www.cabelas.com/catalog/browse/personal-defense/_/N-1100279/Ns-CATE 
GORY_SEQ_104496480?WTz_l=SBC%3BMMcat104792580%3Bcat104778180 (last visited 
Mar. 29, 2014) (selling three Smith & Wesson collapsible batons for $29.99 to $44.99, 
depending on length). 
44. WEAPONS & PROTECTIVE SYS., supra note 42, at 4-2. 
45. See Personal Defense, supra note 43 (selling three Smith & Wesson collapsible 
batons for $29.99 to $44.99, depending on length, and a Taser C2 Gold Kit for $399.99). 
46. WEAPONS & PROTECTIVE SYS., supra note 42, at 4-2. 
47. See Clip-On Batons, ASP USA, https://www.asp-usa.com/store/batons/clip-on-
batons.html (marketing the P12 clip-on baton as 5 1/8 inches closed while 11 5/8 inches open). 
48. CAL. DEP’T CONSUMER AFFAIRS, BUREAU OF SEC. & INVESTIGATIVE SERVS., 
BATON TRAINING MANUAL: STUDENT TEXT 16 (2006), available at http://www.bsis.ca.gov/f
orms_pubs/bat_stuman.pdf. 
PETERMAN-FINAL (6-16-14) (DO NOT DELETE) 7/2/2014  5:25 PM 
2014] SECOND AMENDMENT DECISION RULES 863 
balls composed of rubber, wood, or foam and are only available to law 
enforcement or military personnel.49  These projectiles can be 
particularly effective at incapacitating an intruder while reducing the 
impact of residual or collateral damage.50  If these weapons are used 
improperly, they can cause injury and, in some cases, death; however, 
these weapons substantially decrease the risk of death to the intended 
target and others.51 
B. Electric Weapons 
Electric weapons are energy devices that use pain and muscle 
tenancy (or involuntary muscle convulsion) to affect the targeted 
person.52  Electric weapons come in two types: stun guns and tasers.53  
Stun guns must directly touch the intended target, leaving the user in a 
particularly vulnerable position.54  Tasers, on the other hand, employ 
 
49. See Impact Munitions, DEF. TECH., http://www.defense-
technology.com/specialty_impact.aspx (last visited Feb. 1, 2014); see also, e.g., Foam Baton—
40 mm Product Spec Manual, SAFARILAND (Dec. 2011), available at http://www.defense-
technology.com/pdfs/specs/6099_40%20mm%20Foam%20Baton%20Round%20Rev%2012-
11.pdf (warning that the foam baton product is to be used only by trained military personnel 
or law enforcement). 
50. See DAVID K. DUBAY & PAUL J. MARQUARD, 2003 SPECIFICATION MANUAL: 
DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY, KINETIC AND IMPACT PARAMETERS OF LESS-LETHAL 
MUNITIONS (2003), available at http://www.defense-technology.com/pdfs/resources/kinetic% 
20impact%20analysis.pdf.  Unfortunately, much of the ballistic testing data of these types of 
munitions is held by the military and is not available to the public, but Defense Technology 
has published some of its findings, which resulted in a greater understanding for the less-than-
lethal nature of the munitions.  Id.  According to its tests, the kinetic energy used in its 
munitions is on par with a .22 bullet, which can penetrate a human at most distances because 
the force is concentrated in such a small area, unlike a bean bag projectile.  Id.  However, the 
blunt force projectiles can still cause serious impact trauma because more force is being 
transferred to the body versus being “pushed” into the body like a .22 round.  Id. 
51. KEN HUBBS & DAVID KLINGER, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, IMPACT MUNITIONS 
USE: TYPES, TARGETS, EFFECTS 2–3 (2004), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/ 
206089.pdf (reporting eight individuals’ deaths from being hit with impact munitions and two 
additional deaths from lethal rounds mistakenly fired instead of impact munitions). 
52. Nat’l Inst. of Justice, How Conducted Energy Devices Work, NIJ.GOV (June 23, 
2008), http://www.nij.gov/nij/topics/technology/less-lethal/how-ceds-work.htm. 
53. Mesloh et al., supra note 42, at 134.  See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,636,412 B2, at [57] 
(filed Dec. 12, 2001).  This patent for Taser International, Inc., includes a brief description: 
“A hand-held stun gun incapacitates a human target by generating a series of powerful 
electrical output pulses across first and second spaced apart output terminals in response to 
closure of a trigger.”  Id.  Taser devices are also known as “tethered systems.”  WEAPONS & 
PROTECTIVE SYS., supra note 42, at 4-11. 
54. Volokh, Nonlethal Self-Defense, supra note 19, at 204; Stun Gun vs Taser, TBO-
TECH, http://www.tbotech.com/stungun-vs-taser.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2014). 
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tethered wires with barbed hooks that transfer the electric current from 
some distance away.55  Consumers are moving towards tasers, which 
shoot two electrically charged darts up to fifteen feet, over stun guns, 
which require direct contact with the attacker.56  One major 
disadvantage of tasers is their high cost.57 
Electric weapons are much more effective than blunt force objects 
and irritant sprays because of their speed, accuracy, and effect on the 
target’s central nervous system.  Yet, electric weapons are not without 
controversy; more than 330 people died after police used electric 
weapons on them between 2001 and 2008, but most of these deaths were 
attributed to other causes.58  However, by their own accounts, electric 
weapons have been used and rigorously tested by more than 11,000 law 
enforcement agencies.59  Additionally, in the cases where individuals 
died as a result of being shocked, law enforcement had subjected the 
individual to multiple shocks, often lasting longer then the prescribed 
 
55. WEAPONS & PROTECTIVE SYS., supra note 42, at 4-11.  In recent years, the use of 
electric weapons in movies and television has increased.  See, e.g., HANNIBAL 99:10–25 
(Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 2001); Archer: White Elephant (FX Networks television broadcast 
Jan. 13, 2014). 
56. Stun Gun vs Taser, supra note 54; Taser Maker Targets Civilian Sales, ABC NEWS 
(Feb. 16, 2005), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/Technology/story?id=501101&page=1&singlePa
ge=true.  More recently, Taser International has developed a weapon that has a removable 
cartridge, and the weapon itself can be used as both a taser and stun gun, as the weapon can 
be used as a stun gun after the user has fired the taser’s darts.  See TASER INT’L, INC., TASER 
X26C OPERATING MANUAL 10 (2007), available at https://www.taser.com/images/support/do
wnloads/downloads/mk-inst-x26c-001_rev_a_x26c_manual.pdf (stating the device can be used 
as a “traditional stun gun-type device” after its probes have been fired).  But the company 
does not sell weapons with stun gun or direct-contact features as the primary function 
anymore.  See Self Defense Products, TASER INT’L, INC., http://www.taser.com/products/self-
defense-products (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).  Only Hawaii, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New 
York, and Rhode Island prohibit the use of electronic weapons by the general public.  See 
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134-16 (LexisNexis 2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, § 131J 
(West 2002 & Supp. 2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-3.h. (West 2005); N.Y. PENAL LAW 
§ 265.01(1) (Consol. 2000 & Supp. 2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-47-42 (2002 & Supp. 2013).  
Additionally, Michigan and Wisconsin provide an exception for the general public if they 
have a concealed carry permit.  See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.224a(2)(b) (West Supp. 
2013); WIS. STAT. §§ 175.60(1)(d), 941.295(2g) (2011–2012). 
57. See Personal Defense, supra note 43 (selling a Taser C2 Gold Kit for $399.99). 
58. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 34, at 2 (summarizing AMNESTY INT’L, ‘LESS THAN 
LETHAL’? THE USE OF STUN WEAPONS IN US LAW ENFORCEMENT 1 (2008)). 
59. Id.  After research, the Department of Justice claimed that more than 15,000 law 
enforcement and military agencies use electric weapons.  GEOFFREY P. ALPERT ET AL., 
NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, POLICE USE OF FORCE, TASERS AND OTHER LESS-LETHAL 
WEAPONS 1 (2011), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/232215.pdf. 
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five seconds, thus in conflict with recommended use.60 
Electric weapon manufacturers warn against the use of their devices 
on small children and those who are physiologically or metabolically 
compromised, pregnant, infirm, or elderly, as well as individuals with 
heart conditions or pacemakers, or with low body-mass index.61  A 
secondary hazard can occur if the victim falls after being stunned and is 
injured.62  Although these injuries seem severe, when individuals are 
properly trained, non-lethal weapons such as electronic weapons can 
significantly reduce lethality.63 
C. Irritant Sprays 
Irritant sprays are meant to disable an individual by shooting a foam 
or spray containing an irritant capable of causing temporary blindness, 
intense pain, and trouble breathing.64  Oleoresin Capsicum (OC), 
commonly called “pepper spray,”65 can be varied in its strength and 
delivery system.66  Methods of delivery include fog, stream, foam, gel, 
 
60. See GEOFFREY P. ALPERT ET AL., supra note 59, at 16; see also AMNESTY INT’L, 
supra note 34, at 2 (noting that more than 330 people have died in the United States after 
being stuck by police tasers since 2001).  Unfortunately, the use of electrical weapons is not 
without risk, but when compared with the fatality rate among gunshot victims, the risk is 
incredibly low.  See ACLU OF S. CAL., supra note 34, at 27 (noting that seven people in 
California who had been sprayed with OC died either in police custody or while struggling 
with police between January 5 and September 9, 1993); Volokh, Nonlethal Self-Defense, supra 
note 19, at 205 (explaining that the death rate from gunshot wounds is about 20% and the 
death rate from knife wounds is roughly 2%). 
61. See, e.g., TASER INT’L, INC., TASER CEW WARNINGS, INSTRUCTIONS, AND 
INFORMATION: CITIZEN 2–3 (2013).  However, it is virtually impossible to tell if some of 
these conditions exist, especially when one is being attacked or threatened. 
62. Id. 
63. See, e.g., GEOFFREY P. ALPERT ET AL., supra note 59, at ii; see also Taser Saves 
Man’s Life, TVNZ (June 13, 2012, 2:46 PM), http://tvnz.co.nz/national-news/taser-saves-man-
s-life-4927748 (reporting that a man who stabbed himself in the stomach and barricaded 
himself in his home was tasered when police were unable to disarm the man and transport 
him for medical treatment). 
64. What Is Pepper Spray? Is Pepper Spray Dangerous?, MED. NEWS TODAY (Nov. 25, 
2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/238262.php. 
65. A RESEARCH GUIDE FOR CIVIL LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 40, at app. B at 
64.  Pepper spray, or oleoresin capsicum, is a derivative of a food product from different chili 
peppers that have been dried, ground, and combined with a liquid, allowing it to be sprayed 
through the air.  Id. 
66. See, e.g., Jeanne M. Ditter & Charles S. Heal, Application and Use of Riot Control 
Agents, in RIOT CONTROL AGENTS: ISSUES IN TOXICOLOGY, SAFETY, AND HEALTH 17, 17–
20 (Eugene J. Olajos & Woodhall Stopford eds., 2004); DAVID NANCE, SEC. EQUIP. CORP., 
SABRE O.C. PEPPER SPRAY STUDENT PROGRAM, available at http://www.doc.nv.gov/sites/d
oc/files/training/south/2013_academy/week_6/SABRE_End_User_Training_PPT_1_1_13/Stu
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and powder.67  Each delivery system has its own advantages and 
disadvantages68 but should be used properly for the intended effect.  
Additionally, Ortho Chlorobenzylidene Malononitrile (CS),69 
Chloroacetophenone (CN or Mace),70 Diphenylarenamine Chloroarsine 
(DM),71 Hexachlorethane (HC),72 and calmative or sedative agents73 are 
all forms of irritant sprays.74 
 
dent_OC_Powerpoint.pdf (presentation on pepper spray by David Nance, Vice President of 
Security Equipment Corp.). 
67. DAVID NANCE, supra note 66; WEAPONS & PROTECTIVE SYS., supra note 42, at 4-
14. 
68. See DAVID NANCE, supra note 66. 
69. STEVEN L. HOENIG, COMPENDIUM OF CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS 138–39 
(2007).  CS gas can be dispensed by burning, aerosol, or explosion and immediately come into 
contact with the lungs, eyes, skin, and nasal linings causing irritation, burning, coughing, and a 
runny nose (this description of effects is greatly understated—personal experience of the 
author at Ft. Jackson during Basic Training).  Id. 
70. Peter G. Blain, Tear Gases and Irritant Incapacitants: 1-Chloroacetophenone, 2-
Chlorobenzylidene Malononitrile and Dibenz[B,F]-1,4-Oxazepine, 22 TOXICOLOGICAL REV. 
103, 104–08 (2003) (discussing the makeup of tear and irritant gases).  CN is similar to CS, but 
is the most toxic of irritant gases and at high concentrations has caused deaths resulting from 
pulmonary injury, asphyxia, or both.  Id. 
71. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, REVIEW OF THE ARMY NON-STOCKPILE CHEMICAL 
MATERIEL DISPOSAL PROGRAM: DISPOSAL OF CHEMICAL AGENT IDENTIFICATION SETS 
15 & tbl.1-1 (1999).  Commonly known as Adamsite, this aerosol is a vomiting agent and 
causes many of the same effects as CN and CS gas but is slower to develop and can last many 
hours.  Id. at 15 tbl.1-1, 16 tbl.1-2. 
72. U.S. EPA, CHEMICAL NAME & SUMMARY FACT SHEET: HEXACHLOROETHANE 
(2012), available at http://www.epa.gov/wastes/hazard/wastemin/minimize/factshts/hexchlet.pd
f.  HC is a gas that is used by the military in the production and use of smoke grenades and 
other weapons that produce smoke.  Id.  Although not formally a non-lethal weapon in the 
traditional sense, HC is used to blind and disorient an enemy and can therefore at times be 
considered a non-lethal weapon.  WEAPONS & PROTECTIVE SYS., supra note 42, at 4-16.  
When employing HC gas to distract, confuse, or otherwise psychologically distress the enemy, 
it is no longer being used as a non-lethal weapon and, in some instances, may be classified as 
an act of psychological warfare. 
73. See JOAN M. LAKOSKI ET AL., THE ADVANTAGES AND LIMITATIONS OF 
CALMATIVES FOR USE AS A NON-LETHAL TECHNIQUE 15 & tbl.2 (2000).  Different types of 
drugs have been examined for potential use as a calming agent, such as opiates, anti-
psychotics, neurolept anesthesia, ketamine, benzodiazepines, rohypnol (date rape drug), and 
non-benzodiazepines (Ambien).  Id. at 13 tbl.1; Nat’l Inst. of Justice, Community Acceptance 
Panel—Riot Control Agents, NIJ.GOV (July 11, 2008), http://nij.gov/topics/technology/less-
lethal/Pages/riot-control-agents.aspx.  Russian Special Forces used fentanyl, a potent opium-
based narcotic, on Chechen terrorists and hostages during the 2002 siege on the Dubrovka 
Theatre in Moscow, resulting in the deaths of over 119 civilians.  Russia Names Moscow Siege 
Gas, BBC NEWS (Oct. 31, 2002, 2:25 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2377563.stm. 
74. See WEAPONS & PROTECTIVE SYS., supra note 42, at 4-13–4-16.  While these agents 
are not typically available to civilians, their availability to military and law enforcement may 
trigger their acceptance as “commonly used” and therefore must be kept in mind when 
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Irritant sprays can be less effective than tasers because the target 
may be able to withstand the type of irritant used.  The target can 
quickly evade the spray, or worse yet, the spray can accidently blow 
back in the user’s face, putting the user at a substantially higher risk 
than before the spray was employed.75  Sprays can be used multiple 
times, unlike tasers, and do not require contact with the target at arm’s 
length, like stun guns.76  Additionally, irritant sprays are relatively cheap 
and compact and can be easily stored in a pocket or purse, or placed on 
a key-chain.77 
While the use of non-lethal weapons is not without its critics,78 the 
three main varieties that would be most common and available to 
ordinary citizens are blunt-force objects, electric weapons, and irritant 
sprays.  All three weapon types can be used as arms in the functional 
sense and they constitute another type of weapon suited to self-defense.  
This general description of non-lethal weapons, as well as their function 
and use, should provide the context for discussing the legal framework 
that surrounds arms and how the Court determines what weapons 
qualify as arms. 
III. THE SECOND AMENDMENT GENERALLY, “ARMS” DEFINED, AND 
THE RECENTLY CREATED RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE 
In order to discuss whether non-lethal weapons are protected by the 
Constitution, the Second Amendment must be described with a 
particular focus on arms and how the Court determines whether those 
 
discussing definitions and decisional rules for the Second Amendment.  See discussion infra 
Part III.A–B. 
75. See Volokh, Nonlethal Self-Defense, supra note 19, at 206. 
76. Id. at 207. 
77. See Personal Defense, supra note 43 (selling a multitude of pepper sprays, the least 
expensive being $6.99, most of which have key rings for portability). 
78. See, e.g., DAVID W. HAGY, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, STUDY OF DEATHS 
FOLLOWING ELECTRO MUSCULAR DISRUPTION: INTERIM REPORT 1–4 (2008), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/222981.pdf (surveying the medical consequences that result 
from the use of electric weapons such as tasers); David P. Fidler, The International Legal 
Implications of “Non-Lethal” Weapons, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 51, 63–65 (1999) (describing 
various ethical, legal, medical, and political problems with non-lethal weapons such as: non-
lethal weapons violating principles of international law, causing unintended health 
consequences, and putting law enforcement officers, military forces, and civilians in greater 
danger); Stephen Coleman: The Moral Dangers of Non-Lethal Weapons, TED TALKs (Feb. 
2012), http://www.ted.com/talks/Stephen_coleman_the_moral_dangers_of_non_lethal_weapo
ns.html (describing moral issues related to the use of non-lethal weapons such as 
indiscriminate use, death, the use of non-lethal weapons as a “lethal force multiplier,” and 
poor training to use such weapons). 
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weapons are protected.  The historical context that led up to the Court’s 
ruling in District of Columbia v. Heller, and its subsequent incorporation 
in McDonald v. City of Chicago,79 will show why the current decisional 
rules were created and how they create shortcomings when evaluating 
arms. 
The Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated Militia, being 
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep 
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”80  While the relevant portion of 
the Amendment to this discussion is arms, one brief point must be 
made.  For quite some time, there have been two general theories about 
what the Second Amendment protects: (1) an individual right; or (2) a 
group or militia based right.81 
Heller settled that question: The Second Amendment provides an 
individual right.82  The question remains: What are arms under the 
Second Amendment? 
A. “Arms” under Miller? 
Post-Heller, the Second Amendment provides for an individual right 
to keep and bear arms for self-defense.83  In McDonald, the Court 
incorporated the individual right against the states via the Fourteenth 
 
79. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010). 
80. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
81. See STAFF OF S. SUBCOMM. ON THE CONSTITUTION, S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 
97TH CONG., THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS (Comm. Print 1982); STEPHEN P. 
HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT 3–6 (1984); JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN 
ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT ix–xi (1994); H. RICHARD UVILLER & WILLIAM G. MERKEL, 
THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMS, OR, HOW THE SECOND AMENDMENT FELL SILENT 
1–5 (2002); Roy G. Weatherup, Standing Armies and Armed Citizens: An Historical Analysis 
of the Second Amendment, in 3 GUN CONTROL AND THE CONSTITUTION: SOURCES AND 
EXPLORATIONS ON THE SECOND AMENDMENT 1, 1–3 (Robert J. Cottrol & Paul Finkelman 
eds., 1993); William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43 
DUKE L.J. 1236, 1236–38 (1994); Clayton E. Cramer & Joseph Edward Olson, What Did 
“Bear Arms” Mean in the Second Amendment?, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 511, 511 (2008); 
Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 
82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 206–07 (1983); Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second 
Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 640 (1989); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the 
Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461, 466–71 (1995); Eugene Volokh, “Necessary to the 
Security of a Free State,” 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2007); Eugene Volokh, The 
Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 793–94 (1998); Randy E. Barnett, 
Was the Right to Keep and Bear Arms Conditioned on Service in an Organized Militia?, 83 
TEX. L. REV. 237, 237 (2004) (reviewing UVILLER & MERKEL, supra). 
82. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008). 
83. Id. at 592, 636; see also McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036, 3050. 
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Amendment and elucidated that the right to keep and bears arms is 
“among those fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered 
liberty.”84  The Court made clear that the right was not unlimited but 
declined to provide an analytical framework to evaluate regulations of 
arms in the future.85 
A looming question that remains after Heller and McDonald is 
whether non-lethal weapons are arms that are protected by the Second 
Amendment.  The majority opinion in Heller spent considerable time 
discussing United States v. Miller86 and its holding that the Second 
Amendment does not provide an individual right, but a right to arms 
that have a “reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of 
a well-regulated militia.”87  Miller holds that arms are protected under 
the Second Amendment if the weapon is in “common use” at the 
present time and is ordinarily a military-related piece of equipment.88 
To determine whether a weapon is protected as an arm under Miller, 
the weapon must be reasonably related to the purpose of the Second 
Amendment.89  In Miller, the defendant transported an unregistered 
sawed-off shotgun across state lines, violating the National Firearms Act 
of 1934.90  The Court evaluated whether the sawed-off shotgun matched 
the purpose of the Second Amendment, a collective right that must be 
reasonably related to the militia, to determine whether the weapon 
 
84. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3042, 3050. 
85. Id. at 3047. 
86. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
87. Heller, 554 U.S. at 622–24 (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 178). 
88. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178–79. 
89. See id. at 178. 
90. Id. at 175.  The National Firearms Act (NFA) of 1934 created a tax on the 
production and transfer (to sell and purchase) of certain firearms that were listed under the 
Act.  National Firearms Act, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. 
§§ 5801–5872 (2006)).  Additionally, the production and transfer of NFA weapons requires 
registration with the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue.  National Firearms Act, 48 Stat. 
at 1237–38.  The Act was created in response to the high gang-based crime of the era and was 
supposed to reduce and ultimately prevent the transmission and production of certain Class 
III weapons.  See, e.g., Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, National Firearms Act, ATF.GOV, http://www.atf.gov/content/firearms/firearms-
industry/national-firearms-act (last visited Apr. 1, 2014); SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-
REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN 
AMERICA 259 n.69 (2006).  The original weapons subjected to the Act were shotguns and 
rifles with barrels that were less than eighteen inches in length and certain firearms described 
as “any other weapons” (i.e., machine guns and silencers, sometimes called mufflers).  
National Firearms Act, 48 Stat. at 1236. 
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would be protected.91  The Miller Court ultimately held that the sawed-
off shotgun was not reasonably related to the militia purpose.92  This 
militia “end in view” application was used until Heller. 
The Court in Heller stated that the militia purpose is not the limit on 
the legislature’s ability to restrict and regulate private weapons93 and, in 
dicta, that “Miller stands only for the proposition that the Second 
Amendment right, whatever its nature, extends only to certain types of 
weapons.”94  An explanation of the end in view approach and the 
differing interpretations that have been used is explained in an article by 
Michael P. O’Shea,95 who argues that there are three interpretations of 
Miller’s end in view rule: weak Miller96; intermediate Miller97; and strong 
Miller.98  Each view purports to demonstrate the nexus needed between 
the weapon and purpose (militia use), required to satisfy constitutional 
scrutiny.  Under weak Miller, protection for possessing and using 
firearms is only for service connected to a state militia.99  Intermediate 
Miller allows for many uses as long as they have some relation to the 
militia; this view necessarily prohibits use for personal self-defense.100  
Finally, strong Miller encompasses the lower Miller interpretations, but 
it protects possession and use for other “traditionally legitimate 
purposes, such as private self-defense.”101 
Strong Miller is where defining arms becomes critical because not all 
types of personal weapons qualify as arms; only arms that are 
 
91. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.  On appeal, Miller presented no appellate brief and his 
counsel failed to show for oral argument.  See Brian L. Frye, The Peculiar Story of United 
States v. Miller, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 48, 66–67 (2008).  The Court, in Heller, 
emphatically argued that the fact that no party argued against the governmental action is a 
fairly strong reason to doubt the Miller analysis.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 623 (arguing “reason 
enough, one would think, not to make [Miller] the beginning and the end of this Court’s 
consideration of the Second Amendment”).  While the argument that lack of an adversary is 
strong evidence of a reason to doubt the analysis of Miller may have merit, it is not clear that 
the Court would have come up with a better or more well-reasoned analysis. 
92. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178. 
93. Heller, 554 U.S. at 622. 
94. Id. at 623. 
95. Michael P. O’Shea, The Right to Defensive Arms After District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 349, 354–62 (2009). 
96. Id. at 354–55. 
97. Id. at 355–57. 
98. Id. at 358–62. 
99. Id. at 354–55. 
100. Id. at 355–57. 
101. Id. at 358–59. 
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reasonably related to militias are protected.  The threshold question in 
Miller and under strong Miller is whether the weapon under scrutiny is 
“part of the ordinary military equipment” and is “of the kind in common 
use at the [present] time.”102  This approach provides a litany of 
problems when advances in technology put new weapons—that can be 
more or less lethal—in the hands of soldiers.103  According to this 
approach, weapons like fully automatic assault rifles, grenade launchers, 
and light machine guns could be in common use when used by soldiers, 
and certain state and federal limits could be unconstitutional.104 
B. “Arms” under Heller and McDonald? 
The Miller approach was, in some senses, all but obliterated by 
Justice Scalia’s holding in District of Columbia v. Heller.105  In Heller, a 
police officer brought suit to enjoin a longstanding District of Columbia 
ban on handguns.106  Justice Scalia, after a lengthy historical analysis,107 
invalidated the ban on the grounds that it violated the Second 
Amendment individual right to keep and bear arms for self-defense of 
“hearth and home.”108  To prevent outright overruling Miller, the Court 
created an exception for Miller and held that Miller was not based on 
the right but the weapon because sawed-off shotguns can never be used 
for any law-abiding purpose.109 
The Court in Heller defined arms as “[anything] that a man wears for 
his defence, or takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or strike 
 
102. Id. at 358 (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 
178–79 (1939)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  This approach protects personal-defense 
arms that are connected to a militia purpose.  Id. at 358–59 (citing David T. Hardy, A Well-
Regulated Militia: The Founding Fathers and the Origins of Gun Control in America, 15 WM. 
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 1237, 1237 (2007) (reviewing CORNELL, supra note 90)).  In a footnote 
to Saul Cornell’s commentary on the mind frame of the Court during the Miller decision, he 
argues that the Court wanted to maintain flexibility in dealing with the Second Amendment 
because of two concerns of the time: (1) the passage of federal gun control laws in response to 
the growth of organized crime; and (2) Hitler’s rise in Europe.  See CORNELL, supra note 90, 
at 259 n.69. 
103. See O’Shea, supra note 95, at 380–83. 
104. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(4) (2012) (prohibiting the sale of any destructive 
device, as defined in § 921(a)(4), or machinegun). 
105. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 624–25 (2008). 
106. Id. at 575–76. 
107. See id. at 576–619. 
108. See id. at 635. 
109. See id. at 622–25. 
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another”110—a very broad definition.  More important, “the Second 
Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute 
bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the 
founding.”111 
The Court did not go on to declare the District of Columbia ban 
unconstitutional solely on the grounds that the home is the most 
protected place and that there is a right to self-defense within the home 
for arms, but it added that the fact that the ban was against handguns 
was significant: 
The handgun ban amounts to a prohibition of an entire class of 
“arms” that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society for 
that lawful purpose [of self-defense].  The prohibition extends, 
moreover, to the home, where the need for defense of self, 
family, and property is most acute.  Under any of the standards 
of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional 
rights, banning from the home “the most preferred firearm in the 
nation to ‘keep’ and use for protection of one’s home and 
family,” would fail constitutional muster.112 
The concern is that a statement banning all restrictions on the ability 
of individuals to defend themselves will allow homeowners to use any 
means (e.g., machineguns and grenades) for self-defense.  To clarify, the 
opinion merely protects handguns for self-defense within the home and 
does not address what types of arms are protected in the home and 
whether the self-defense granted under the Second Amendment extends 
beyond the home to cover other residences, self-owned businesses, or 
properties.113 
The Court then goes on to explain that Miller is read only for the 
proposition “that the Second Amendment does not protect those 
weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful 
purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns.”114  And, in dicta, the Court 
 
110. Id. at 581 (quoting 1 T. CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW DICTIONARY 
(2d ed., London, W. Flexney 1771) (unpaginated, definition of “Arms”)). 
111. Id. at 582.  This certainly supports the idea that non-lethal weapons, such as 
electronic weapons, are prima facie protected. 
112. Id. at 628–29 (footnote omitted) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Parker v. 
District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 400 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).  It could be the case that this is dicta 
and that Heller could have been completely dealt with on the right to self-defense grounds, 
leaving the Court free to reconfigure its decisional rules for arms. 
113. See id. at 635. 
114. Id. at 625. 
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indicated that the long standing bans on possession of arms by certain 
people (such as felons and the mentally ill), and in certain places, is not 
in question.115  What the Court in Heller does is change the purpose of 
the Second Amendment.  The Second Amendment under Miller 
protects only those arms that had a nexus to the militia and under Heller 
the nexus is to self-defense.116  One of the fundamental problems with 
this approach is that Heller does not abandon Miller’s common use 
test.117  Once Heller changed the purpose, and therefore the nexus, the 
common use test should have been adjusted for the self-defense 
purpose. 
The current common use test for militias is not abandoned and is 
used as an argument that legislative bans on “dangerous and unusual 
weapons” are sufficient to meet constitutional scrutiny.118  Justice Scalia 
includes, as a list of the weapons deemed dangerous and unusual, the 
short-barreled shotgun and machine gun.119  A problem is that all 
weapons are inherently dangerous, so allowing bans on “dangerous 
weapons” could allow a ban on all weapons.  An “unusual weapon” 
designation is not helpful either: Weapons that are not normally used by 
the militia today, such as a musket, could be banned because it is 
currently unusual.  It is certain that the Founders would have argued 
strenuously against the regulation of muskets. 
 
115. Id. at 626–27 (stating, in dicta, that “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast 
doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally 
ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and 
government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale 
of arms”). 
116. Compare United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (holding that arms need 
to have “some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated 
militia”), with Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (holding that citizens have the right to possess a firearm 
in their homes for the purpose of self-defense). 
117. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 627. 
118. See id.  Justice Scalia holds that the limitation on “dangerous and unusual” weapons 
is “supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual 
weapons.’”  Id.  However, there is no precedential support beyond Miller, which has been 
effectively overruled because society today lacks traditional militias and the limitation uses 
the logical flow of weapons associated with militias used in Miller to continue a prohibition on 
dangerous and unusual weapons not based on self-defense within the home.  Unfortunately, 
this mix-and-match use of decisional rules provides for more confusion than consistency.  See 
discussion infra Part IV. 
119. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 625, 627.  Although Justice Scalia did not use the term 
“machine gun,” he was likely referring to the M16A-1 rifle, which has fully automatic 
capabilities.  See id. 
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Aside from an issue of circularity,120 the presumption that arms are 
prima facie protected conflicts with the requirement that they be in 
common use.  This is not to mention the issue that arises when advances 
in technology create new and innovative ways to protect us.  Just as the 
First Amendment protects new forms of speech, the Second 
Amendment should protect new forms of arms, and the current test 
does not do this.121 
Additionally, the current test sets certain weapons up to fail to gain 
constitutional protection because Congress restricted those weapons in 
the past, preventing those weapons from being in common use.  
Unfortunately, this approach partly harkens back to the analysis under 
Miller and neglects to recognize that the National Firearms Act of 1934 
effectively caused weapons to be removed from common use because of 
pricing and regulation.122  In Heller, arms do not include weapons that 
are not commonly possessed for lawful purposes.123  Again, this 
decisional rule is problematic.  Heller further concludes that to “bear 
arms” means to “wear, bear, or carry [weapons] upon the person or in 
the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose . . . of being armed and 
ready . . . in a case of conflict with another person”;124 there is an 
individual right to carry “in case of confrontation.”125  This definition 
begs the question: Do citizens ordinarily wear, bear, or carry weapons 
upon their person, in their clothing, or pocket, being armed and ready 
 
120. See O’Shea, supra note 95, at 381, 384–86 (arguing that using a constitutional rule 
that bases protection on the “presence or absence” of certain arms “runs a serious risk of 
harmful circularity”). 
121. See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & 
Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 197–98 (5th Cir. 2012) (adopting a two-step framework for Second 
Amendment challenges based on guidance from the First Amendment); Ezell v. Chicago, 651 
F.3d 684, 699 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that the Second Amendment “protects similarly 
intangible and unqualifiable interests” as the First Amendment).  The Ezell Court goes on to 
explain that Second Amendment infringements are not the kind that can be compensated by 
damages.  Id. 
122. See National Firearms Act, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934) (codified as amended at 26 
U.S.C. §§ 5801–5872 (2006)); Craig S. Lerner & Nelson Lund, Heller and Nonlethal Weapons, 
60 HASTINGS L.J. 1387, 1393 (2009).  Lerner and Lund explore the idea that but for the NFA, 
many of the weapons that are “unusual” would not be unusual today, and Justice Scalia’s 
failure to address this issue “empowers Congress to create its own exceptions to the Second 
Amendment so long as the Supreme Court waits awhile before it checks to see whether 
particular weapons are in common civilian use.”  Lerner & Lund, supra, at 1392–93. 
123. Heller, 554 U.S. at 625. 
124. Id. at 584 (alterations in original) (quoting Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 
125, 143 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
125. Id. at 592. 
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for conflict inside their abode?126  No—of course not.  To “bear arms” 
based on the Heller definition suggests that there is a right to self-
defense outside the home because people do not bear arms inside their 
house, they only possess them.127  Two questions remain unclear by the 
Court’s decision: (1) What are lawful arms; and (2) What is commonly 
possessed? 
In McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court held that the individual 
right to self-defense recognized in Heller is applicable to states via the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.128  McDonald 
presented a very similar factual scenario to Heller but failed to add any 
significant discussion about arms.  In McDonald, the City of Chicago 
banned private ownership of handguns within the city, and plaintiffs 
were Chicago residents who desired to possess a handgun for self-
 
126. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 936 (7th Cir. 2012). 
127. See Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that 
the Second Amendment extends outside the home); Moore, 702 F.3d at 936 (holding that 
Illinois’ ban on concealed weapons was unconstitutional).  The Seventh Circuit was the first 
circuit to suggest that the Second Amendment right to self-defense extends outside the home 
when it held that the right to practice with firearms at a range is an ancillary of the right.  
Ezell v. Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 704–10 (7th Cir. 2011).  Additionally, state courts in Illinois, 
Ohio, Oregon, Michigan, and a plurality in Georgia have found a right to carry in public.  
Hertz v. Bennett, 751 S.E.2d 90, 96 (Ga. 2013) (Blackwell, J., concurring); People v. Aguilar, 2 
N.E.3d 321, 327 (Ill. 2013); People v. Yanna, 824 N.W.2d 241, 246 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012); 
State v. Christian, 307 P.3d 429, 443 n.11 (Or. 2013).  On the other hand, the Second and 
Third Circuits have both failed to recognize an absolute right to carry in public spaces.  Drake 
v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 431 (3d Cir. 2013), petition for cert. filed, 82 U.S.L.W. 3449 (U.S. Jan. 9, 
2014) (No. 13-827); Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 96 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. 
denied, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013).  And the state courts that do not extend the right to carry 
outside the home are California, D.C., Maryland, Massachusetts, and New York.  People v. 
Dykes, 209 P.3d 1, 43–44 (Cal. 2009); Little v. United States, 989 A.2d 1096, 1101 (D.C. 2010); 
Williams v. State, 10 A.3d 1167, 1177, 1179 (Md. 2011); Commonwealth v. McCollum 945 
N.E.2d 937, 954 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011); People v. Perkins, 880 N.Y.S.2d 209, 210 (App. Div. 
2009).  Thomas Jefferson listed an individual right to self-defense with other individual 
freedoms: 
The constitutions of most of our States assert, that all power is inherent in the 
people; that they may exercise it by themselves . . . or they may act by 
representatives, freely and equally chosen; that it is their right and duty to be at all 
times armed; that they are entitled to freedom of person, freedom of religion, 
freedom of property, and freedom of the press. 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Major John Cartwright (June 5, 1824), in 16 THE WRITINGS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 42, 45 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1903) 
(emphasis added). 
128. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 
(2010). 
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defense.129  The statute banning weapons was almost the same as the ban 
in Heller.130  The issue on appeal only dealt with the application of the 
Court’s holding in Heller and whether the individual right to keep and 
bear arms for self-defense within the home was applicable to the states 
via the Fourteenth Amendment.131 
Justice Alito’s plurality opinion focused mainly on the issue of 
incorporation but held, in line with Heller, that there is an individual 
right to bear arms for self-defense within the home.132  The opinion 
adopted the exceptional language from Heller that “prohibit[s] . . . the 
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill” and “forbid[s] the 
carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government 
buildings, or . . . impos[ed] conditions and qualifications on the 
commercial sale of arms” and applied it to the states.133  The plurality 
merely adopted the Heller language and failed to provide further 
decisional rules or guidance on arms and what is sufficient to qualify a 
weapon as “commonly possessed.”  Further, the Court failed to provide 
an analytical framework for firearm challenges. 
IV. NON-LETHAL WEAPONS STATUES & REGULATIONS TODAY 
Non-lethal arms statutes and regulations are typically governed by 
individual states and are so complex that average citizens are generally 
unable to follow or comprehend the laws.  States certainly have a right 
to regulate within their borders, to be sure, but a state’s ability to 
regulate pales in comparison to the monumental task that interstate 
travelers will face when attempting to follow state and local laws while 
moving through multiple states.  Additionally, the federal government 
has statutes governing firearms but lacks any individual or 
 
129. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026. 
130. Compare Heller, 554 U.S. at 630 (“Except for law enforcement personnel . . . , each 
registrant shall keep any firearm in his possession unloaded and disassembled or bound by a 
trigger lock or similar device unless such firearm is kept at his place of business, or while 
being used for lawful recreational purposes within the District of Columbia.” (alterations in 
original) (quoting D.C. CODE § 7–2507.02 (2001))), with McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026 (noting 
that the “City ordinance provides that ‘[n]o person shall . . . possess . . . any firearm unless 
such person is the holder of a valid registration certificate for such firearm.’  The Code then 
prohibits registration of most handguns, thus effectively banning handgun possession by 
almost all private citizens who reside in the City.” (alterations in original) (internal citation 
omitted) (quoting CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-20-040(a) (2009))). 
131. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036, 3050. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 3047 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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comprehensive statute governing non-lethal weapons.  This section will 
help illustrate the problems that are associated with the convoluted 
nature of the state-by-state non-lethal weapons scheme, which leaves 
many travelers without the opportunity for self-defense. 
A. The Upper Mid-West: A Complicated Array of State-by-State Non-
Lethal Weapons Statutes 
One of the major problems that interstate travelers, especially truck 
drivers and families taking vacations, face when attempting to carry or 
use non-lethal weapons for self-defense is the plethora of varying and 
sometimes confusing statutes that make up state and local laws.  To 
comply with each state’s law, the traveler would have to spend an 
extraordinary amount of time—or hire an attorney, something that 
individuals traveling cross-country likely cannot afford—researching 
law, and possibly interpreting it incorrectly, creating a heavy burden on 
the traveler.  One only needs to look at a couple of articles to 
understand the complexity and utter frustration that trained legal 
professionals, let alone non-legally trained citizens, will find when 
attempting to properly follow and categorize the array of state non-
lethal weapons laws.134 
1. State-by-State 
The primary objective of this state-by-state review is to show that 
the current statutory scheme in an increasingly mobilized country can 
create major problems for travelers and result in self-defense threats 
with little recourse.  In particular, truckers and families traveling cross-
 
134. See, e.g., Volokh, Nonlethal Self-Defense, supra note 19, 199 app. 2 (listing the vast 
array of different non-lethal weapons statues throughout the states and various provisions of 
such statues that do not always make clear whether a particular defensive weapon, device, or 
implement is banned or not); Steven W. Kranz, Comment, A Survey of State Conceal and 
Carry Statutes: Can Small Changes Help Reduce the Controversy?, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 637, 
646–47, 654–56, 637 app. (2006) (discussing the complexity of “shall-issue” licensing, the 
problems associated with inconsistent statutory schemes among states, and listing thirty-eight 
pages of state concealed carry laws); see also Ryan S. Andrus, Note, The Concealed Handgun 
Debate and the Need for State-To-State Concealed Handgun Permit Reciprocity, 42 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 129, 155–56 (discussing the need for consistency and supporting a nation-based solution, 
but also acknowledging federalism concerns).  Another layer of complexity that occurs with 
shall-issue licensing is that the statutes mainly address handguns and are not always clear 
whether licensing applies to handguns alone or includes concealable weapons.  Unlike most 
states, Illinois’ new concealed carry statute explicitly excludes electric weapons, among 
others.  430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 66/5 (West 2014) (“‘Handgun’ does not include . . . a stun 
gun or taser . . . .”). 
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country are particularly vulnerable to the different state laws they must 
follow regarding the purchase, use, and possession of non-lethal 
weapons.135  This section will start by explaining the varied and 
complicated non-lethal weapons statutes in Illinois, Michigan, 
Wisconsin, Indiana, and Minnesota.  While evaluating the different 
statutes, it will be easy to demonstrate that individuals who travel from 
state-to-state will become overwhelmed by trying to figure out and 
comport with the laws and will do one of two things: (1) forgo carrying a 
weapon altogether and thus subject themselves to increased risk of 
harm; or (2) carry the weapon illegally, recognizing that they would 
rather protect themselves and their family and risk potential liability 
than go unarmed.  This section will also demonstrate that that if one 
state in a line of states prohibits the carrying of non-lethal weapons, it 
can make it incredibly difficult to carry and use those weapons in 
bordering states. 
Before forging on, it is critical to have a brief understanding of 
concealed carry laws and reciprocity.  Concealed carry laws in each state 
vary, but generally speaking, they provide for an application process 
that a citizen will complete in order to obtain and carry a weapon.136  
Each state has different requirements, such as a minimum amount of 
training, or disqualifiers, such as a conviction for an act of violence.137  
Reciprocity allows a non-resident to carry within that state, subject to 
certain requirements and restrictions.138  The most typical requirement is 
that the non-resident has a concealed carry permit from his home 
state.139  Each state decides whether or not to offer reciprocity to other 
states and vice-a-versa.140  Throughout the multiple state surveys, 
reciprocity arrangements may arise. 
a. Illinois 
Before July 9, 2013, Illinois was the last state to enact legislation that 
 
135. These two types of travelers, families on vacation and truckers, were picked 
because they are most likely to travel interstate and would be the most likely to need 
protection because they spend so much time on the road and would be required to comply 
with varying state and local laws before entering each state. 
136. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 175.60 (2011–2012). 
137. See, e.g., id. § 175.60(3)–(4). 
138. See, e.g., id. § 175.60(18). 
139. See, e.g., WIS. ADMIN. CODE JUS § 17.13 (May 2013). 
140. See, e.g., id. 
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allows citizens to conceal and carry weapons.141  Two cases provided the 
impetus for this legislation: a Seventh Circuit case and an Illinois 
Supreme Court case.142  After a tumultuous round of legislating and 
negotiating, and a looming deadline, the state passed a new concealed 
carry law that allows citizens to carry handguns.143  While the state of 
Illinois passed a shall issue concealed carry statute in response, the law 
explicitly exempts a stun gun or taser.144  The criminal code prohibits the 
carry and possession of a “bludgeon, black-jack, slung-shot, sand-club, 
sand-bag, metal knuckles or other knuckle weapon regardless of its 
composition, throwing star, or any knife,” or any stun gun or taser if it is 
carried with an intent to use it against another “unlawfully,” unless 
“when on his land or in his own abode, legal dwelling, or fixed place of 
business, or on the land or in the legal dwelling of another person as an 
 
141. See Firearm Concealed Carry Act, Ill. P.A. 98-63 (2013) (codified at 430 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 66/1–999 (2014)); Brenden Moore, Illinois Gears Up for Concealed Carry, 
DEPAULIA (Jan. 12, 2014, 9:01 PM), http://www.depauliaonline.com/nation-world/illinois-
gears-up-for-concealed-carry-1.3129740#.UuKz19LnaM8; William Spain, Illinois Allows 
Concealed Firearms to Be Carried, USATODAY.COM (Jan. 8, 2014, 6:52 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/01/08/illinois-concealed-guns-carry-chicago/ 
4379409/. 
142. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012), reh’g en banc denied, 708 
F.3d 901, 902 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that Illinois’ concealed carry ban was unconstitutional 
and giving the state 180 days to enact legislation); People v. Aguilar, 2 N.E.3d 321, 328 (Ill. 
2013) (holding that the state’s aggravated unlawful use of a weapon statute, which prohibited 
concealed carry, violated the Second Amendment). 
143. Ray Long et al., General Assembly Overrides Governor's Veto of Concealed Carry 
Bill, CHI. TRIB. (July 9, 2013 10:10 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/
chi-illinois-concealed-carry,0,4356935.story.  Illinois’ Governor, Pat Quinn, was attempting to 
provide more stringent regulation of handguns in the bill: to include a ban on carrying 
firearms in places that sell alcohol, to restrict magazine capacity, and to limit the carrying of a 
concealed firearm to one at a time.  Id.  Although Governor Quinn attempted to change the 
bill through an amendatory veto, the legislature overrode the altered bill.  Id.; Bill Status of 
HB0183, ILGA.GOV, http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/billstatus.asp?DocNum=0183&GAID=1
2&GA=98&DocTypeID=HB&LegID=69231&SessionID=85&SpecSess=#actions (last visited 
Apr. 6, 2014). 
The amendatory veto process is a power granted to Illinois governors allowing them 
to make changes to bills that have passed.  If a simple majority in each chamber 
accepts the governor's changes, the altered bill becomes law.  If three fifths of each 
chamber (36 of the state's 59 senators, and 71 of the 118 representatives) vote to 
override the veto, the original bill becomes law. If neither happens, the bill is dead. 
Kurt Hofmann, Governor Quinn Violates U.S. and Illinois Constitutions Simultaneously, 
EXAMINER.COM (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.examiner.com/article/governor-quinn-violates-u-
s-and-illinois-constitutions-simultaneously; see also ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 9. 
144. See Firearm Concealed Carry Act, Ill. P.A. 98-63 § 5 (2013) (codified at 430 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 66/5 (West 2014)) (“‘Handgun’ does not include . . . a stun gun or 
taser . . . .”). 
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invitee with that person’s permission, any pistol, revolver, stun gun or 
taser or other firearm.”145  It is legal to carry a non-lethal “liquid gas or 
substance” that is designed for personal use (i.e., irritant sprays).146 
b. Wisconsin 
Under Wisconsin law, an individual who possesses or uses electric 
weapons is guilty of a Class H felony unless the individual is a licensee 
or is carrying in his own dwelling, place of business, or on his own 
land.147  The most recent exception allowed by state law for the carry of 
concealed electric weapons is that the individual is a licensee.148  For 
concealed carry purposes, a “weapon” is “a handgun, an electric 
weapon, . . . a knife other than a switchblade knife . . . or a billy club.”149  
A licensee must be at least twenty-one years of age, pass a background 
investigation, and provide proof of training.150  Additionally, the 
 
145. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24–1(a)(1)–(4) (West 2010).  However, the exception 
for abode does not apply to or affect the transport of such weapons unless they (1) “are 
broken down in a non-functioning state”; (2) “are not immediately accessible”; or (3) “are 
unloaded and enclosed in a case, firearm carrying box, shipping box, or other container by a 
person who has been issued a currently valid Firearm Owner’s Identification Card.”  Id. 5/24–
1(a)(4). 
146. Id. 5/24–1(a)(3). 
147. WIS. STAT. § 941.295(1m), (2g) (2011–2012).  This excludes police officers, armed 
forces on duty, or corrections personnel.  Id.  By contrast, individuals who carry a concealed 
handgun are guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.  WIS. STAT. § 941.23(2).  A Class H felony 
subjects the convicted to “a fine not to exceed $10,000,” imprisonment not exceeding six 
years, or both.  Id. § 939.50(3)(h).  A Class A misdemeanor subjects the convicted to a fine 
not to exceed $10,000, imprisonment not exceeding nine months, or both.  Id. § 939.51(3)(a).  
By the logic of the Wisconsin statutes, the penalty for possessing an electric weapon subjects 
one to a substantially higher maximum penalty than the concealed carry of a pistol, 
potentially five years and three months more imprisonment. 
148. 2011 Wis. Act 35 § 38 (codified at WIS. STAT. § 175.60(1)(j), (2g)). 
149. WIS. STAT. § 175.60(1)(j). 
150. Id. § 175.60(3)(a), (4)(a), (9)(g).  The training requirement according to Wisconsin 
Act 35 is a copy of a document that the applicant completed training for any of the following: 
hunter safety program; firearm safety course conducted by a state or national organization, 
law enforcement agency, or school; military training; or unrevoked concealed carry license 
from another state.  2011 Wis. Act 35 § 38 (codified at WIS. STAT. § 175.60(4)(a)); CCW 
Training Requirements, WIS. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.doj.state.wi.us/dles/cib/conceal-
carry/training-requirements (last visited Feb. 3, 2014).  After Wisconsin Act 35 was passed, 
the Wisconsin Department of Justice and Attorney General, J.B. Van Hollen, were given 
authority to promulgate rules regarding training and decided that four hours training was 
sufficient to meet statutory requirements.  2011 Wis. Act 35 § 22 (codified at WIS. STAT. 
§ 165.25(12m)); Mark R. Hinkston, Wisconsin’s Concealed Carry Law, WIS. LAW., July 2012, 
at 10, 15.  The governor of Wisconsin, Scott Walker, approved the DOJ’s temporary four-
hour training requirements until permanent rules were written.  Patrick Marley, Concealed 
Weapons Rules Signed, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 15, 2011, at B1.  In November, the 
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individual must be legally able to own and possess a handgun.151 
Interestingly, the concealed carry statute does not restrict devices 
that contain and deploy OC.  Tear gas, UV dye, or combination sprays 
are not permissible, while OC spray is legal, subject to Wisconsin 
Department of Justice regulations.152  These regulations provide that the 
device cannot contain more than 10% OC,153 the entire weight of 
ingredients must not exceed sixty grams,154 and if it is sold in Wisconsin, 
it must have an effective range of at least six feet, but not more than 
twenty feet.155  It is less clear what blunt force weapons can be possessed 
or carried on one’s person, concealed, or in the vehicle.156  Like most 
states, possessing these devices within your own home, on your own 
land, or within your place of business, is legal.157 
 
Legislature’s Joint Committee for Review of Administrative Rules overruled J.B. Van Hollen 
and, by a 7-3 split, removed the hourly training requirement from the rules.  Patrick Marley, 
Need for 4 Hours of Gun Training Tossed, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 8, 2011, at A1. 
151. WIS. STAT. § 175.60(3). 
152. Id. § 941.26(4)(a), (4)(i)(2); WIS. ADMIN. CODE JUS § 14.05 (Feb. 2014). 
153. JUS § 14.05. 
154. Id. § 14.07. 
155. Id. § 14.06. 
156. Weapons for concealed carry purposes are handguns, electric weapons, knives 
other than switchblades, or billy clubs.  WIS. STAT. § 175.60(1)(j).  However, these weapons 
only seem to apply to concealed carry because there is a special statute that restricts the 
possession of electric weapons for everyone except permit holders, Id. § 941.295, while there 
are no other possession statutes for other blunt objects.  However, Wisconsin does restrict 
“dangerous weapons” for those under eighteen.  Id. § 948.60(2)(a).  That statute has a special 
definition for dangerous weapons that only applies to that section and includes: 
[A]ny firearm, loaded or unloaded; any electric weapon, as defined in s. 
941.295(1c)(a); metallic knuckles or knuckles of any substance which could be put to 
the same use with the same or similar effect as metallic knuckles; a nunchaku or any 
similar weapon consisting of 2 sticks of wood, plastic or metal connected at one end 
by a length of rope, chain, wire or leather; a cestus or similar material weighted with 
metal or other substance and worn on the hand; a shuriken or any similar pointed 
star-like object intended to injure a person when thrown; or a manrikigusari or 
similar length of chain having weighted ends. 
Id. § 948.60(1).  The ultimate conclusion is that if the weapons are specifically listed under 
section 948.60 and not listed under section 175.60, then all the other weapons are okay for 
concealed possession. 
157. WIS. STAT. § 941.295(2g)(b).  Prior to the passage of Wisconsin Act 35, Wisconsin 
did not protect one’s ability to carry weapons in one’s place of business and, up until 2003, 
private business owners were unable to conceal weapons at their places of business.  See 2011 
Wis. Act 35 § 55 (codified at WIS. STAT. § 941.23(2)(e)); State v. Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, ¶¶ 3–
4, 84, 264 Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 785 (holding that private store owners have a 
constitutional right to concealed carry).  Wisconsin does not recognize concealed carry in a 
vehicle for those without a license.  See, e.g., State v. Fisher, 2006 WI 44, ¶¶ 32, 65, 290 Wis. 
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c. Michigan 
The state of Michigan allows electric weapons to be openly carried 
in public,158 possessed in the home,159 or concealed carry with a license.160  
A licensee (whether resident or non-resident) is required to carry a valid 
driver’s license and concealed carry license anytime they are carrying.161  
Additionally, if someone who is carrying a concealed weapon is stopped 
by a peace officer, he must “immediately disclose to the peace officer 
that he or she is carrying a pistol” or other weapon.162  Further, a peace 
officer can request to see the person’s license and at that time, the 
person must show the peace officer his license to carry a concealed 
pistol and his driver’s license.163  The possession and carrying of a “self-
defense spray or foam device” is allowed subject to certain device 
requirements,164 but is generally allowed for those over eighteen years of 
age.165  Finally, the possession and carry of dangerous weapons are 
restricted to the home, place of business, or other land owned by that 
 
2d 121, 714 N.W.2d 495 (using an “extraordinary circumstances” test for carrying in vehicles); 
State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶¶ 49, 50, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328.  The extraordinary 
circumstances test created a rule that will almost always prevent concealed carry in a vehicle.  
Unless the individual “reasonably believes that he or she is actually confronted with a threat 
of bodily harm or death and that carrying a concealed weapon is necessary for protection 
from the threat,” ordinary circumstances exist.  Fisher, 2006 WI 44, ¶ 32 (emphasis added).  
This process (or test) is devoid of realties in the real world.  The problem is that individuals 
are not given notice prior to an assault, robbery, rape, or murder.  Justice Ann Walsh Bradley 
(the author of the opinion) seems to be operating in an academic and legal world where all 
criminals abide by basic presumptions of logic, which is wholly out of touch with the practical 
effects of this test, and effectively prevents individuals from protecting themselves until it is 
too late.  See Fisher, 2006 WI 44.  Robbers and rapists do not send you a formal memo giving 
you sufficient notice to get some concealed carry permit or other self-defense weapon before 
they strike—they operate on surprise. 
158. People v. Yanna, 824 N.W.2d 241, 245–46 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that 
tasers and stun guns were arms sufficient for protection under the Second Amendment). 
159. Id. at 246. 
160. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.224a(2)(b) (West Supp. 2013).  Additionally, non-
residents can carry concealed in Michigan if they are licensed by another state to carry.  Id.; 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.432a(1)(h) (West 2012). 
161. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.425f(1) (West 2012).  This requirement applies to all 
law enforcement personnel, including other state and federal officers.  Id. 
162. Id. § 28.425f(3). 
163. Id. § 28.425f(2). 
164. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.224d(1)(a) (West Supp. 2013) (requiring the 
device to contain “[n]ot more than 35 grams of [CS] and inert ingredients. . . .  [or] not more 
than 10% [OC]”). 
165. Id. § 750.224d(4). 
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person.166 
d. Indiana 
The Indiana statute prohibiting an individual from carrying a 
handgun on himself or in his vehicle without a license167 applies to 
electric weapons.168  However, to carry or possess other dangerous 
weapons seems legal because there is minimal regulation of those 
objects.  The only place in the statutes where “deadly weapon” is used is 
where a predicate crime, like battery, was committed with a deadly 
weapon.169  Chemicals designed to incapacitate are considered deadly 
weapons when used unlawfully, but there is no statute directly 
prohibiting the purchase, possession, or carry of irritant sprays or their 
subsequent use for self-defense.170 
 
166. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.227(1) (West 2004) (“A person shall not carry a 
dagger, dirk, stiletto, a double-edged nonfolding stabbing instrument of any length, or any 
other dangerous weapon, except a hunting knife adapted and carried as such . . . .”).  A dirk is 
a dagger.  THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 513 (4th 
ed. 2000).  The 17th century Scottish dirk came from the medieval ballock dagger, a short, 
thinner, more concealable weapon than the more modern dirk.  See Chad Arnow, Spotlight: 
The Scottish Dirk, MYARMOURY.COM, http://www.myarmoury.com/feature_spot_dirks.html 
(last visited Jan. 15, 2014).  For an interesting history of the dirk and its development, see id.  
The Imperial Japanese Navy officers carried and used the dirk, unlike the English officers 
who carried a sword.  FRED. T. JANE, THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY 276 (1904).  The 
stiletto the statute references is not the stiletto heel (although some could certainly be used as 
weapons), but a dagger-like knife intended to be used for stabbing as opposed to regular 
daggers that can slash and cut.  PETER LIMBURG, WHAT’S IN THE NAMES OF ANTIQUE 
WEAPONS 78 (1973). 
167. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-47-2-1 (LexisNexis 2009). 
168. Id. § 35-47-8-4.  Minors are also prohibited from purchasing or possessing electric 
weapons.  See id. § 35-47-8-5(a). 
169. See, e.g., id. § 35-42-2-1(a)(3).  These statutes increase the felony level when 
committing crimes with “deadly weapons,” which are defined as a “loaded or unloaded 
firearm” or  
A destructive device, weapon, device, taser . . . or electronic stun 
weapon . . . equipment, chemical substance, or other material that in the manner 
it . . . could ordinarily be used; or . . . is intended to be used; is capable of causing 
serious bodily injury. 
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-31.5-2-86(a) (LexisNexis 2012).  However, this statue excludes law 
enforcement officials when using the device according to their training and while engaged in 
official duties.  Id. § 35-31.5-2-86(b). 
170. See id. § 35-31.5-2-86(a); supra notes 69–74 (discussing the use of chemicals 
designed to incapacitate). 
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e. Minnesota 
In Minnesota, citizens may possess and use electric weapons and tear 
gas compounds to defend themselves.171  These weapons are subject to 
multiple regulations, such as requiring that the device be labeled or 
accompanied with instructions,172 that local licensing requirements are 
followed,173 and that they cannot be sold to minors or to individuals who 
have committed certain crimes.174  However, minors under sixteen can 
possess tear gas compounds with the permission of their parent or 
guardian; minors under eighteen are prohibited from possessing any 
electric weapons.175  The use of blunt force objects takes a slightly tricky 
trajectory: possessing and carrying most dangerous weapons is legal 
unless done for an unlawful purpose.176  Dangerous weapons do not 
include metal knuckles or switch blade knives because a separate line in 
that subsection specifically precludes the manufacture, possession, or 
sale of those items.177  Although minors are able to handle or use a 
firearm, air gun, ammunition, or explosive (hopefully this means 
fireworks) with their parent’s written permission, the statutes do not 
clarify what other non-lethal weapons can be carried by minors.178 
2. State-by-State Problems 
The problems inherent in a state-by-state system where individuals 
are prevented from protecting themselves with non-lethal weapons are 
 
171. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.731 subd. 2 (West 2009).  Under this statute, authorized 
tear gas compounds include “a lachrymator or any substance composed of a mixture of a 
lachrymator including chloroacetophenone, alphachloroacetophenone; phenylchloromethylk-
etone, orthochlorobenzalmalononitrile or oleoresin capsicum, commonly known as tear gas.”  
Id. § 624.731 subd. 1(1). 
172. Id. § 624.731 subd. 2(a). 
173. Id. § 624.731 subd. 5. 
174. Id. § 624.731 subd. 3(a)–(b).  Also, like most states, Minnesota law does not 
prohibit the possession and use of these devices by local, state, and federal law enforcement 
and the military.  Id. § 624.731 subd. 6. 
175. Id. § 624.731 subd. 3(a). 
176. Id. § 609.66 subd. 1(1)–(5).  Subsection 5 specifically forbids the possession of “any 
other dangerous article or substance” used unlawfully.  Id. § 609.66 subd. 1(5). 
177. See id. § 609.66 subd. 1(4).  The dangerous weapons definition is quite broad.  Id. 
§ 609.02 subd. 6 (“‘Dangerous weapon’ means any firearm, whether loaded or unloaded, or 
any device designed as a weapon and capable of producing death or great bodily harm, any 
combustible or flammable liquid or other device or instrumentality that, in the manner it is 
used or intended to be used, is calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily harm, or 
any fire that is used to produce death or great bodily harm.”). 
178. See id. § 609.66 subd. 1b. 
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heightened when individuals are traveling in their vehicles, especially 
with their families.  Traveling families and truckers spend most of their 
time in vehicles driving, and they spend nights in motels, at truck stops, 
or on the side of the road.  While making these trips, these travelers are 
particularly vulnerable to attacks in the form of hijackings, cargo thefts, 
sexual assaults, and abductions.179  The heightened use of roadways 
throughout the country has increased roughly sixty-five percent in the 
past twenty-five years,180 underscoring the increasingly important need 
for individuals to protect themselves within their own vehicles. 
The problem of interstate non-lethal weapons statutes may be 
demonstrated by imagining the different laws a trucker or family of four 
traveling from Minnesota to Michigan (necessitating travel through 
Wisconsin, Illinois, and Indiana) would encounter.  In Minnesota, adults 
and minors above sixteen can carry irritant spray, including tear gas 
compounds, and adults can use electric weapons.181  Moving to 
Wisconsin, irritant sprays are allowed, except one must be eighteen 
years of age182 and all other weapons are unavailable to possess unless 
one has a concealed carry license.183  Additionally, a licensee must be 
 
179. See Blake Morrison, Along Highways, Signs of Serial Killings—At Least 459 
Believed Slain in the Past 40 Years, USA TODAY, Oct. 5, 2010, at A1 (reporting 459 murders 
by suspected serial killers who use the interstate highway system to find and dispose of the 
bodies); Bruce C. Smith, Highway Hijackers Target Truckers’ Loot, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, 
Feb. 25, 2010, at A1 (reporting the assault and hijacking of a truck driver in Indiana and the 
rise of highway-based hijackings); Highway Serial Killings: New Initiative on an Emerging 
Trend, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2009/april/highwayser
ial_040609 (last visited Feb. 19, 2014) (announcing the Highway Serial Killings initiative to 
raise awareness among law enforcement and the general public regarding the issue); Man 
Arrested in Multimillion-Dollar Car Theft Ring Based in Illinois, LEADER (Oct. 8, 2012, 6:38 
PM), http://leaderpub.com/2012/10/08/man-arrested-in-multimillion-dollar-car-theft-ring-base 
d-in-illinois/ (reporting a multi-million dollar car theft ring that used the interstate highway 
system).  In response to crime on the interstate system, the National Crime Prevention 
Council created a national Highway Watch system, similar to a neighborhood 
watch.  See Strategy: Highway Watch, NAT’L CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL, http://www.nc 
pc.org/topics/home-and-neighborhood-safety/strategies/strategy-highway-watch (last visited 
Feb. 8, 2014). 
180. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., TRAFFIC VOLUME TRENDS: 
DECEMBER 2012 (2013), available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/travel_monit
oring/12dectvt/12dectvt.pdf (reporting the total travel in millions of vehicle-miles traveled in 
1987 at 1,924,328, and in 2012 at 2,938,535). 
181. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.731 subd. 2, 3. 
182. See WIS. STAT. § 941.26(4)(k) (2011–2012) (“Any person who has not yet attained 
the age of 18 years and who possesses a device or container described in par. (a)[, a device or 
container that contains OC,] is subject to a Class E forfeiture.”). 
183. See id. § 175.60(1)(j), (2g). 
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twenty-one years old, barring the possible possession of these weapons 
for someone who is not yet twenty-one.184  If a family was traveling 
through Wisconsin, the only non-lethal weapon it could possess would 
be an irritant spray, preventing travelers from possessing and carrying a 
majority of non-lethal weapons options.185  Once the travelers move into 
Illinois, the issues become much more complicated.  Although 
concealed carry recently went into effect in Illinois, the legislation does 
not authorize concealed carry of a stun gun or taser.186  Additionally, if 
one does not have a concealed carry permit, most weapons in a vehicle 
must be in the trunk, locked up, disassembled, or have the batteries 
removed.187  This means that anyone who is not from the state of Illinois 
must adhere strictly to the vehicle transportation laws and must be 
lawful possessors in their home state.188 
Next, Indiana requires a license to concealed carry, but it is not clear 
if the state prohibits the possession or use of certain non-lethal weapons, 
whether one is walking about in public or in one’s vehicle.189  Michigan 
does allow the family to possess a weapon in the vehicle, but if pulled 
over the family must immediately notify law enforcement that it is in 
possession of a weapon, and the family is prevented from possessing and 
carrying other dangerous weapons in the family’s vehicle.190  Ultimately, 
the practical reason for carrying non-lethal weapons in your vehicle—
self-defense—is rendered pointless when you travel through some of 
these states because restrictions in one state can prevent the ability to 
 
184. See id. § 175.60(3)(a). 
185. See id. § 941.26(4)(a), (4)(i)(2); WIS. ADMIN. CODE JUS ch. 14 (Feb. 2014). 
186. Firearm Concealed Carry Act, Ill. P.A. 98-63 § 5 (2013) (codified at 430 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 66/5 (2014).  Illinois does allow non-residents to get a concealed carry permit, but 
there is no reciprocity for those that currently have a concealed carry permit from another 
state, except if individuals are driving through Illinois and the weapon remains in the vehicle.  
See 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 66/40.  This can create additional burdens for non-residents 
driving through Illinois. 
187. 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 65/2(a)(1), (b)(9) (West 2014).  The Illinois Supreme 
Court recently reversed the ban preventing non-residents from possessing a weapon or 
ammunition unless they had a FOID card.  See People v. Holmes, 948 N.E.2d 617, 624 (Ill. 
2011).  After this ruling, if one is moving from Milwaukee, Wisconsin to Gary, Indiana the 
trip would normally take 120 miles or two hours (depending on Chicago area traffic); 
however, under prior Illinois law, this same trip would have required a major detour in order 
to comply—either through the upper peninsula of Michigan (747 miles or 12 hours) or out to 
Iowa and down and around Illinois (1,124 miles or 18.5 hours). 
188. See Holmes, 948 N.E.2d at 624; 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 66/40. 
189. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-47-2-1, 35-47-8-4 (LexisNexis 2009). 
190. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.425f(3) (West 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 750.227(1) (West 2004). 
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possess in other states, even if your final destination allows for the 
possession of those weapons.  Additionally, this would create issues for 
someone who owns and possesses these weapons legally in one state but 
is moving to certain other states, like Illinois191 or Michigan.192  The 
complicated nature of state-by-state statutes, coupled with the increased 
need for individuals to protect themselves in their vehicles, underscores 
the need for more constitutional clarity in regard to what qualifies as 
arms and how far the right of self-defense extends. 
B. Federal Non-Lethal “Arms” Statues & Regulations 
There are two areas where the federal government has rules in 
regard to arms: laws and regulations.193  The Firearm Owners' Protection 
Act (FOPA),194 commonly cited in reference to interstate firearms 
travel, protects persons traveling with firearms through states that would 
otherwise prohibit them.195  However, FOPA does not extend to non-
 
191. See supra Part IV.A.1.b.  According to the Illinois State Police website, “[n]ew 
Illinois residents have sixty calendar days after obtaining an Illinois driver’s license or Illinois 
Identification Card to obtain a FOID card.” Firearm Owner’s Frequently Asked Questions, 
ILLINOIS ST. POLICE, http://www.isp.state.il.us/foid/firearmsfaq.cfm (last visited Feb. 5, 2014).  
However, the answers on the website “are meant only to give general guidance” regarding 
transporting firearms and ammunition.  Id.  “The answers do not and are not meant to 
replace statutory language.”  Id.  And finally, individuals transporting weapons are still 
required to follow all the state laws and local ordinances, of which, the City of Chicago and 
other Chicago area suburbs have seemingly changed after McDonald v. City of Chicago.  See 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct 3020, 3047–50 (2010); Firearm Owner’s Frequently 
Asked Questions, supra; see also Azam Ahmed, NRA Sues Chicago, 3 Towns to Repeal Bans 
on Firearms, CHI. TRIB., June 28, 2008, at 18; James Kimberly & Andrew L. Wang, Suburbs 
with Gun Bans Split on Court Ruling, CHI. TRIB., June 27, 2008, at 20.  Although the City of 
Highland Park, a suburb of Chicago, still has a handgun possession prohibition on its books 
that would prevent non-residents from coming into the community with a handgun, it 
provides exceptions for law enforcement, military, and a few others.  HIGHLAND PARK, ILL., 
CODE § 134.003 (1974), available at http://www.cityhpil.com/documents/21/31/CHAPTER%2
0134%20HANDGUN%20CONTROL_201310240852059539.pdf. 
192. See supra Part IV.A.1.c. 
193. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. ch. 44 (2012); 27 C.F.R. pt. 479 (2013). 
194. Firearm Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986) (codified 
at 18 U.S.C § 921). 
195. 18 U.S.C. § 926A.  See, e.g., Coal. of N.J. Sportsmen v. Florio, 744 F. Supp. 602, 
609–10 (1990).  The safe harbor provision provides: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of any law or any rule or regulation of a State 
or any political subdivision thereof, any person who is not otherwise prohibited by 
this chapter from transporting, shipping, or receiving a firearm shall be entitled to 
transport a firearm for any lawful purpose from any place where he may lawfully 
possess and carry such firearm to any other place where he may lawfully possess and 
carry such firearm if, during such transportation the firearm is unloaded, and neither 
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lethal weapons.  Another set of laws deal with the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), under Chapter 44 of Title 18 of the 
United States Code, which regulates federal gun laws.196  The federal 
firearms law covers five broad areas: prohibited persons;197 acquisition 
and manufacture;198 interstate transportation;199 antiques;200 and unlawful 
use.201  Each of these areas revolves around the term “firearm,” which is 
defined as “(A) any weapon (including a starter gun) which will or is 
designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the 
action of an explosive; (B) the frame or receiver of any such weapon; 
(C) any firearm muffler or firearm silencer; or (D) any destructive 
device.”202  Federal law does regulate the purchase, manufacture, or 
possession of tasers because the ATF does not classify tasers as 
firearms.203  However, an argument could be made that a definitional 
 
the firearm nor any ammunition being transported is readily accessible or is directly 
accessible from the passenger compartment of such transporting vehicle: Provided, 
That in the case of a vehicle without a compartment separate from the driver’s 
compartment the firearm or ammunition shall be contained in a locked container 
other than the glove compartment or console. 
18 U.S.C. § 926A. 
196. 18 U.S.C. ch. 44; 28 C.F.R. § 0.130(a)(1) (delegating the Attorney General’s powers 
under 18 U.S.C. ch. 44 to the Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 
Explosives). 
197. 18 U.S.C. § 931. 
198. Id. § 923. 
199. Id. § 922(a)(1)(A). 
200. Id. § 921(a)(3)(D), (a)(16). 
201. Id. § 922. 
202. Id. § 921(a)(3). 
203. BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS, & EXPLOSIVES, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, ATF RULING 80-20 (1980) [hereinafter ATF RULING 80-20], available at 
http://www.atf.gov/files/regulations-rulings/rulings/atf-rulings/atf-ruling-80-20.pdf; 27 C.F.R. 
§ 478.11 (2013) (defining firearm).  The Bureau originally determined that a taser, which used 
gunpowder to fire the electrical barbs, was subject to the federal firearms law: 
Held, a hand-held device designed to expel by means of an explosive two electrical 
contacts (barbs) connected by two wires attached to a high voltage source in the 
device is a “firearm” within the purview of 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(3)(A).  It is also an 
“any other weapon” under the National Firearms Act (26 U.S.C. 5845(e)). 
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS, & EXPLOSIVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATF 
RULING 76-6 (1976), available at http://www.atf.gov/files/regulations-rulings/rulings/atf-
rulings/atf-ruling-76-6.pdf; 27 C.F.R. § 178.11 (1976).  However, subsequent design changes to 
tasers, specifically the mechanism used to release and expel the projectiles, changed from 
gunpowder to a combination of electric battery and nitrogen, convinced the ATF that the new 
models were not firearms and therefore not subject to federal regulations for the 
manufacture, sale, and possession of these devices.  See ATF RULING 80-20, supra; 27 C.F.R. 
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change to “firearm” would include non-lethal weapons under federal 
law or the enactment of different legislation.204 
The federal government does regulate non-lethal weapons through 
several federal agencies, such as the Transportation Security 
Administration,205 Department of the Army,206 and many others that 
regulate what civilians can bring beyond certain points.207  Additionally, 
 
§ 478.11 (2013) (defining firearm); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-464, 
TASER WEAPONS: USE OF TASERS BY SELECTED LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 18 (2005). 
204. Congress could likely enact legislation governing criminal actions and the use of 
non-lethal weapons.  Most of the provisions listed under the federal firearms statutes could 
apply to the regulation of non-lethal weapons.  One interesting discussion would occur if 
Congress attempted to regulate non-lethal weapons in or near schools.  See Gun-Free School 
Zones Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702, 104 Stat. 4789, 4844 (codified at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(q)(2)(A)(2012)).  Although United States v. Lopez would be invoked by arms 
advocates, it is likely that Congress would attempt to tie that regulation more closely to other 
gun laws, similar to the re-written version of the Gun Free School Zones Act, which has not 
been declared unconstitutional.  See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (holding 
the Interstate Commerce Clause does not give Congress the power to regulate the acceptable 
proximity of a gun to a school zone); Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 657, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-369–71 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A)). 
205. 49 C.F.R. § 1540.111 (2013).  However, there are some regulations that allow 
certain airline personnel to carry non-lethal weapons on planes.  See 49 U.S.C. § 44903(i) 
(2006). 
206. 32 C.F.R. §§ 552.101(a)(8), 552.127 (2013) (prohibiting the sale, possession, carry, 
or transportation of certain weapons, including stun guns and tasers, on certain military 
installations and facilitates). 
207. See, e.g., TRANSP. SEC. AGENCY, PREPARE FOR TAKEOFF: TSA’S PROHIBITED 
ITEMS LIST (2014), available at http://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/assets/prohibiteditems_br
ochure.pdf.  For most federal agencies, civilians are not admitted without clearance through 
the organization and a pass through a metal detector.  For example, the TSA screens civilians 
for civilian travel by air and limits the objects that can be taken in the cabin and those that 
can be checked and stored underneath the cabin.  Id.  Most air passengers are unfamiliar with 
TSA regulations that allow travelers to check bags containing certain weapons.  See id. 
(allowing travelers to check box cutters, razors, scissors, swords, ammunition, BB guns, 
firearms, flare guns, axes, hatchets, crowbars, cattle prods, billy clubs, black jacks, brass 
knuckles, kubatons, martial arts weapons, night sticks, nunchucks, electric weapons, throwing 
stars, and one four ounce self-defense spray as long as it has a safety mechanism and contains 
less than 2% of CS or CN).  The TSA recently proposed to allow small knives (no more than 
2.36 inches in length and ½ inch wide) on planes, prompting widespread confusion, concern, 
and opposition, which led to the abandonment of the proposal.  Martin Hugo, Regulation: 
Change Allowing Knives on Planes Is Delayed, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2013, at B1; see also, e.g., 
Matt Hosford & Lauren Effron, American Airlines Joins Opposition to TSA Policy on Knives, 
ABCNEWS.GO.COM (Mar. 12, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/Travel/american-airlines-joins-
opposition-tsa-policy-knives/story?id=18711518; Thom Patterson & Catherine E. Shoichet, 
TSA Chief Faces Critics, Says New Knife Policy Will Stand, CNN.COM (Mar. 15, 2013, 6:45 
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/14/travel/tsa-knives-congress/index.html (discussing the 
TSA Chief’s reasoning for allowing small knives in airline cabins); Opposition to Allowing 
Small Knives on Planes Grows, CBSNEWS.COM (Mar. 8, 2013, 7:02 AM), http://www.cbsnews.
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the Department of Commerce regulates the export sales of tasers.208  
However, the regulation in these cases is very specific and does not 
touch on issues of states’ rights or the ability of individuals to be armed 
for self-defense (because the places that prohibit weapons have armed 
security for protection).  The current federal scheme does not address 
the issue of non-lethal weapons—nor should it.  Federalism issues give 
states most of the power to regulate weapons laws, leaving the Court in 
a unique position to keep the power to regulate in the states’ hands and 
simultaneously allow law-abiding citizens to use non-lethal weapons for 
self-defense. 
V. NON-LETHAL WEAPONS AS “ARMS” AND COMMON USE FOR SELF-
DEFENSE: WHY PRECEDENT & PRACTICALITY SUPPORT THIS 
APPROACH 
The Second Amendment provides for an individual right to self-
defense in the home.209  The Second Amendment also provides a right to 
bear arms for self-defense.210  The questions then become: Does the right 
extend outside the home, and what arms can be used for self-defense?  
Where the problem starts is not with the newly recognized right but with 
the lack of decisional rules, leaving legal scholars and courts to 
speculate: What are arms and what constitutes common use?  This 
problem is compounded by the overly burdensome state laws that 
regulate—and in some cases prohibit—the possession and carry of non-
lethal arms.211  Citizens attempting to use non-lethal weapons as a means 
for self-defense are left without viable alternatives and in some cases 
may carry lethal weapons instead.  The Court has a unique opportunity 
to remedy these problems by adopting a decisional rule that modifies 
common use for new weapons by adding a reasonable use test for self-
defense to new weapons.  Adopting this rule will also add a level of 
 
com/8301-201_162-57573206/opposition-to-allowing-small-knives-on-planes-grows/ (reporting 
opposition to allowing small knives in airline cabins from the flight attendant union, the 
Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association (which represents federal air marshals), 
pilots, and even insurance companies). 
208. 15 C.F.R. pt. 774 supp. 1, 0A985 (2013). 
209. See U.S. CONST. amend. II; District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
210. See U.S. CONST. amend. II; Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
211. See discussion supra Part IV.  Undoubtedly, most states have significant laws 
regarding weapons and new constitutional decisional rules will have a substantial impact on 
those states attempting to comply.  This is why it is so critically important to think about the 
impact that a decisional rule will have for the type of arm and place that is protected by the 
Second Amendment’s right to self-defense. 
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protection for self-defense based on location and arm type in a fashion 
similar to the protections provided by the expectation of privacy under 
the Fourth Amendment.  The discussion below provides the basic 
framework for the actions the Court should take and sets forth the 
precedential and practical support for these decisional rules. 
A. Adjusting “Common Use” 
The entire framework surrounding the determination of arms under 
Heller provides a varied and complicated approach to determining what 
weapons qualify as arms under the Second Amendment.212  Some 
commentators have been concerned about the common use test for 
developments in new weaponry.213  One of these commentators has 
argued for a test that evaluates whether or not the weapon is “no more 
practically dangerous than what is in common use among law-abiding 
citizens.”214  This test would use the elements of Heller: “[C]ommon use, 
unusualness, dangerousness, and use by law-abiding citizens for lawful 
purposes.”215  While this test seems helpful, it still, as the author of the 
test notes, is not a “perfect way of reading” Heller.216 
Understandably, the Court in Heller was constrained by Miller.  The 
common use test alone makes sense when weapons have been around 
and are readily available to the public.  However, the Court could not 
have meant that anytime a weapon achieves common use status it would 
achieve constitutionally protected status because a group like the 
National Rifle Association could tell members to buy more of a 
particular weapon in order to make it commonly used.  This would allow 
lawful possession of certain types of weapons that even the most strident 
supporter of the Second Amendment would feel uncomfortable with.  
And, as argued earlier, this test can prevent problems for those weapons 
banned prior to Miller because some of the weapons have been 
unavailable for the last seventy-five years.217 
These concerns can be remedied without reworking the entire 
 
212. Heller, 554 U.S. at 625–27. 
213. See O’Shea, supra note 95, at 380–84; Ron F. Wright, Comment, Shocking the 
Second Amendment: Invalidating States’ Prohibitions on Taser with the District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 159, 181–84 (2010). 
214. Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: 
An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1482 (2009). 
215. Id. 
216. Id. 
217. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
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common use framework.  Under the “common use for self-defense 
purpose test,” the common use test merely incorporates the self-defense 
purpose when evaluating whether a weapon is an arm.  The test will 
comport with the readings of Miller as merely a weapon issue and not a 
determination of the right.  The test, called the common use for self-
defense purpose test, does not evaluate whether the weapon, 
numerically speaking, is commonly used, but whether the type of arm is 
commonly used for a self-defense purpose.  This test avoids the concerns 
that Justice Scalia has about dangerous and unusual weapons such as 
automatic weapons and sawed-off shotguns.218  Explained another way, 
the test for whether the arm is in common use is that the arm must be 
tied to its self-defense purpose—there must be a nexus between the 
weapon and its self-defense purpose.  Like Miller’s test, which was tied 
to common use for a militia-based purpose,219 the arm must be 
reasonably related to self-defense.  The Court even alluded to this 
concept when it explained why the handgun is “the most preferred 
firearm in the nation . . . for protection of one’s home and family.”220  
Justice Scalia wrote that the handgun is: 
[E]asier to store in a location that is readily accessible in an 
emergency; it cannot easily be redirected or wrestled away by an 
attacker; it is easier to use for those without the upper-body 
strength to lift and aim a long gun; it can be pointed at a burglar 
with one hand while the other hand dials the police.221 
 
218. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 625–27 (2008). 
219. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178–79 (1939). 
220. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29 (quoting Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 
400 (D.C. Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
221. Id. at 629.  While Justice Scalia did not support this statement, Chris Costa, a well-
known figure and one of the top firearms instructors in the country, explains why his choice 
for home defense is a handgun as opposed to a shotgun: 
If I wake up in the middle of the night, half naked, needing to defend my family and 
my home, I can shoot and employ my handgun one-handed while I grab my children 
and maneuver around my house extremely quickly, all the while knowing that I have 
17 rounds at my disposal.  If you have to grab one of your kids because they’ve 
popped out in between you and a threat, then you’re stuck trying to fire a 12 gauge 
one-handed; it can be done (I do it all the time in my demonstrations), but not 
without a lot of practice, and it’s certainly not ideal. 
 I also believe that trying to deal with a threat that you can’t see is a much greater 
concern than one you can see.  If there’s an intruder in my house that is visible, then 
I am actually in the process of solving that particular problem. If there’s someone in 
my house that I can’t see, that scares me much more.  So imagine that you have 
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This list merely needs modification.  Implicit in this test is a 
determination of whether the weapon is discriminate and whether the 
individual can control the weapon in such a manner that there will be 
minimal risk of collateral damage to innocent bystanders.  The test 
above will comport with Miller because Miller only dealt with whether 
the sawed-off shotgun was a protected weapon, not whether the right 
extends to individuals for self-defense.222  This also complies with the 
implicit concern that the Court does not want to allow particularly 
dangerous and unusual weapons.223 
According to the common use test, the AK-47 (being one of the 
most commonly used weapons in the world) could pass scrutiny, while 
muzzle-loading weapons (relegated to use by historians, enactors, and 
enthusiasts) would not be protected as arms.224  Another example is a 
grenade, which is commonly used by the military but is not specifically 
tailored to self-defense and cannot reasonably be used against an 
individual threat without killing multiple people and would therefore 
 
someone in your house that you can’t see, you don’t have ear protection, and you 
don’t have a suppressor and are not using a handgun (handguns naturally being 
quieter than a shotgun)—if you fire that shotgun it’s going to be extremely loud, and 
you will probably lose your hearing for a few minutes.  Those few minutes can be 
vital, because the intruder now knows where you are and you’re unable to be as 
alert as you normally would.  Having that suppressor addition is very important to 
me; using a handgun with a suppressor means if it fires a foot and a half from my 
ears, my hearing is still protected. 
 So to sum it up, if I clear my house during the night with a handgun, I can shoot 
suppressed, I can white light, I can work one-handed if I need to grab one of my 
kids, and if push came to shove I could pistol-punch an intruder with the muzzle of 
my gun.  I can’t do any of that with a shotgun. 
Interview by Rem870.com with Chris Costa, Founder, Costa Ludas (Apr. 27, 2012), available 
at http://www.rem870.com/2012/04/27/full-interview-with-chris-costa/.  Chris Costa spent 
twelve years with U.S. Coast Guard special operations, seven years with Applied Marine 
Technologies, Inc., and four years as President of Magpul Dynamics before building his own 
company, Costa Ludas.  About Us, COSTA LUDUS, http://www.costaludus.com/index.php?rou
te=information/information&information_id=4 (last visited Feb. 14, 2014). 
222. See Miller, 307 U.S. at 175–78.  Although it could be argued that a sawed-off 
shotgun could be used for self-defense, is discriminate (which is much less likely with a sawed-
off shotgun), and can be handled by the individual user, the purpose is not usually self-
defense, but for unlawful activities, which was the big concern in Miller.  Additionally, the 
portion of the test that requires a “reasonable relation” to self-defense would give lower 
courts some discretion deciding when a weapon is typically used for unlawful activity and not 
self-defense. 
223. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 627. 
224. See Marina Koren, The Regrets of the AK-47 Creator, NAT’L J. (Jan. 13, 2014), 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/technology/the-regrets-of-the-ak-47-creator-20140113. 
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fail the reasonably related to self-defense test that is proposed.225 
A practical problem with the common use test is that it can inhibit 
the development of new technology—such as electric weapons, irritant 
sprays, and blunt objects—that can sufficiently stop an attacker while 
substantially reducing lethality.226  Finally, making it more difficult for 
individuals to protect themselves with non-lethal weapons will inevitably 
lead individuals to use lethal weapons instead.  This could lead to the 
same types of restrictions on dangerous and unusual weapons that 
prevent non-lethal weapons from being in common use, which is not the 
desired result.227  Said another way: If a new non-lethal weapon is not in 
common use, it would lack protection as an arm and never be able to 
achieve the status of commonly used, therefore preventing a weapon 
that could be used for self-defense.  The reasonable for self-defense test 
would not inhibit development of non-lethal weapons and would likely 
encourage the private development of such weapons for the market. 
A modified decisional rule that provides the flexibility necessary to 
increase protections for other arms, prevents citizens from walking 
around with sub-machine guns and grenades, and allows private citizens 
to protect themselves with non-lethal weapons in a responsible manner 
can be resolved by adding to the current test for new weapons. 
B. Under the “Common Use for Self-Defense Purpose Test,” Non-Lethal 
Weapons Are “Arms” 
Under the Court’s current analysis, a non-lethal weapon may not 
receive the protection of the Second Amendment.  Non-lethal weapons 
need to be in common use, and according to statistical data, while the 
numbers are increasing, owners of non-lethal weapons pale in 
comparison to firearm owners.228  One of the main concerns of Justice 
Scalia and the Court is preventing dangerous and unusual weapons from 
entering the market.229  In order to fix this problem while simultaneously 
 
225. See DEP’T OF THE ARMY, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., GRENADES AND PYROTECHNIC 
SIGNALS app. A at A-2 (2009) (stating that fragmentation grenades have an effective 
casualty-producing radius of fifteen meters). 
226. See NUTLEY, supra note 35, at 2. 
227. See supra note 208 and accompanying text. 
228. Compare Karp, supra note 14, at 39 (finding that United States citizens own 270 
million firearms), with Taser Maker Targets Civilian Sales, supra note 56 (reporting that Taser 
International has only sold about 100,000 electric weapons since 1994). 
229. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008).  Another significant 
concern is the prevention of prohibited persons, such as felons, individuals adjudicated 
incompetent, minors, unlawful users of drugs, and those convicted of domestic violence, from 
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providing a right to self-defense, the Court employs the common use 
test and a historical analysis of the necessity of banning dangerous and 
unusual weapons, categorically rejecting protection for certain 
weapons.230 
Arms for use in self-defense should be determined by their 
usefulness as a self-defense weapon, which would provide significant 
protection of non-lethal weapons as arms under the Second 
Amendment.  This test would adjust the common use test, functionally 
separating lethal and non-lethal weapons—allowing the Court to give 
heightened protection for non-lethal weapons.  Further, the use of non-
lethal weapons should be reevaluated in light of the type of weapon 
being used and the degree of protection afforded to the individual’s 
location.231 
Arguments could be made that any item could be considered a self-
defense weapon, so long as the purpose is for self-defense.  However, 
virtually all of these can be eliminated through the traditional definition 
of arms and the self-defense purpose.232  The common use for self-
defense purpose test considers a number of factors to determine 
whether the weapon should receive protection: (1) Can the weapons be 
worn or carried; (2) Is the weapon discriminate and easy to control; and 
(3) Is the weapon intended for self-defense?  While there are only three 
factors to the test, they provide reasonable flexibility in allowing new 
weapons while not protecting others. For example, if someone sought 
protections to utilize a dog for self-defense, he would fail to garner 
Second Amendment protection for a variety of reasons: (1) The dog 
cannot be worn or carried (unless it is a Pomeranian and in that case, 
likely not useful for self-defense) and (2) dogs are hard to control and 
are not always discriminate.  While there is certainly room to argue 
 
obtaining weapons.  See Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, § 102, 
107 Stat. 1536, 1538 (1993) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–22 (2012)); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(d).  The proposed reasonableness to self-defense test should not alter or change the 
analysis and result for those traditionally prohibited from obtaining arms.  Although, an 
argument could be made that those traditionally prohibited from carrying firearms should be 
allowed to possess non-lethal weapons in certain limited circumstances because of the 
reduced lethality. 
230. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 625–27. 
231. Location, for the purpose of this test, would be adjusted based on the need for self-
defense.  Accordingly, your level of protection changes based on whether you are at home, in 
a vehicle, or in the public.  Ironically, the need for protection may be reversed compared with 
the test for privacy.  See infra notes 242–43 and accompanying text. 
232. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 581 (quoting CUNNINGHAM, supra note 110 (unpaginated, 
definition of “Arms”)). 
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under the third prong because dogs can be used for self-defense, the 
other two prongs are not met. 
The common use for self-defense purpose will remove weapons that 
are entirely too dangerous but will allow the development of new 
weapons, all while protecting non-lethal weapons and giving lower 
courts the proper deference to resolve these issues.233 
C. Heightened Protections: The House, the Car, and the Public 
The Court has moved from a collective right to an individual right.234  
As the current trend in the circuit courts suggests, the next big 
decisional rule is not the types of arms protected but the degree of 
scrutiny for their possession and whether the right extends outside the 
home.235  As mentioned earlier, Justice Scalia expressed concern for 
weapons not in common use, which is likely his way of preventing 
private citizens from attaining “dangerous and unsual weapons” like 
automatic weapons, cannons, and grenades.236  Although the decisional 
rules on many of these issues have yet to be resolved, a common 
consensus could be built around special protections for non-lethal 
weapons outside the home, especially while in the vehicle. 
No doubt critics of a right to concealed carry of lethal firearms, such 
as pistols, may be reluctant to allow possession of non-lethal weapons 
outside the home.  The concern for the public is increased as the 
possessor leaves the private and enters the public arena.  However, 
allowing for a scale that fluctuates with the location and type of weapon 
possessed should be similar in nature to the Fourth Amendment’s 
expectation of privacy.237  Heller and McDonald stand for the 
proposition that the most important and highly protected place is the 
home.238  This makes sense and should continue along a trajectory that 
mirrors Fourth Amendment protections from unreasonable searches 
and seizures. 
 
233. See supra Part V.A–B. 
234. Compare United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (constructing the Second 
Amendment as a collective right), with Heller, 554 U.S. at 592, 624–26 (constructing the 
Second Amendment as an individual right), and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 
3020, 3050 (2010) (individual right incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
235. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
236. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 625–27; supra Part V.A. 
237. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
238. See supra notes 108, 131 and accompanying text 
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Under the Fourth Amendment, the home (or residence, owned 
property, or place of business) is accorded the most stringent 
protections, followed by the vehicle, and then public places.239  However, 
where there is a difference is the level of scrutiny one would receive 
when leaving the home.  There is also an undoubted right to privacy in 
the home, say to have private sexual relations in one’s home.240  Unlike 
the right to privacy, which does not extend to private acts committed in 
public places because the need for that right is lower, the need for bodily 
integrity and protection from an attacker can occur (and is most 
prevalent) in public.241  As Judge Posner aptly put it “the interest in self-
protection is as great outside as inside the home,”242 even though 
Twenty-first century Illinois has no hostile Indians.  But a 
Chicagoan is a good deal more likely to be attacked on a 
sidewalk in a rough neighborhood than in his apartment on the 
35th floor of the Park Tower.  A woman who is being stalked or 
has obtained a protective order against a violent ex-husband is 
more vulnerable to being attacked while walking to or from her 
home than when inside.  She has a stronger self-defense claim to 
be allowed to carry a gun in public than the resident of a fancy 
apartment building (complete with doorman) has a claim to 
sleep with a loaded gun under her mattress.243 
However, the danger to the public when individuals have weapons 
outside the home is the critical tension.  Creating a sliding scale based 
on location makes sense from a practical perspective and alleviates 
much of the tension.  The common use for self-defense purpose test 
contemplates this same tension when it evaluates whether a weapon is 
 
239. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (home); United States v. Karo, 
468 U.S. 705, 714–15 (1984) (home); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984) (field); 
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589–90 (1980) (home); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 
662–63 (1979) (vehicle); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (public areas); 
Stephen P. Jones, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy: Searches, Seizures, and the Concept of 
Fourth Amendment Standing, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 907, 957 (1997) (“The most sacred of all 
areas protected by the Fourth Amendment is the home.”); Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate 
Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth Amendment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 907 
(2010) (“[P]rivacy in residential search and seizure receives comparatively stronger protection 
than many other contexts, including commercial buildings, certain automobile searches, 
computer databases, and public places.”). 
240. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
241. See id. 
242. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 941 (7th Cir. 2012). 
243. Id. at 937. 
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discriminate and can be controlled by the user.  This is important 
because once the user leaves his home the ability to properly and safely 
use the weapon will reduce the risk of harm to bystanders.  Having 
higher protections for non-lethal weapons is also a viable alternative 
that could be used to reduce the number of lethal weapons being 
purchased and subsequently the number of gun-related deaths.  
Increasing the constitutional protection for non-lethal weapons does not 
guarantee decreases in homicide by guns, or accidental shootings, or the 
number of weapons purchased, but it can certainly put a dent in those 
numbers, and that is something worth seriously considering. 
Additionally, some citizens are unwilling to protect themselves with 
lethal weapons, such as guns or knives.  Certain citizens are unwilling to 
use lethal force for religious, ethical, or moral reasons.244  Some citizens 
are uncomfortable owning firearms because they do not know how to 
use them or have children in the home.  Others may be afraid to pull the 
trigger,245 and some may be concerned about missing their attacker and 
accidently killing innocent bystanders.  All of these concerns can be 
solved with a non-lethal option.  Additionally, women and children, who 
may be the most vulnerable to violence as a class, are often the 
individuals who are most reluctant to carry a gun.246  Some have argued 
that older minors should have a right to self-defense with non-lethal 
weapons because there is an increased risk of violence being 
perpetuated against them.247  For adults, they should always be allowed 
to possess and use non-lethal means to protect themselves; for young 
 
244. See James B. Jacobs, The Regulation of Personal Chemical Weapons: Some 
Anomalies in American Weapons Law, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 141, 144 (1989); Volokh, 
Nonlethal Self-Defense, supra note 19, at 207–08 & n.31 (mentioning Quakers and Buddhists). 
245. Contrary to popular belief, most citizens, and even soldiers, are uncomfortable with 
killing.  See DAVE GROSSMAN, ON KILLING: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL COST OF LEARNING TO 
KILL IN WAR AND SOCIETY 4 (1996).  For a phenomenally interesting and in depth look at 
killing and the military’s psychological training to overcome the fear of killing, see generally 
id.  In his book, Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman specifically addresses the problem of 
“nonfirers” during combat in the Civil War, World War I, and World War II and the 
military’s attempts and eventual success at getting soldiers over their natural compulsion to 
“turn away from that responsibility.”  See id. at 1, 17–28 (quoting S.L.A. MARSHALL, MEN 
AGAINST FIRE: THE PROBLEM OF BATTLE COMMAND 79 (1947)). 
246. Volokh, Older Minors, supra note 21, at 451 (stating that girls age fifteen to 
seventeen are three times as likely to be rape or sexual assault victims than women over 
eighteen, and boys of the same age are three times more likely to be victims of serious violent 
crime than adults); see also Why Women Carry Stun-Guns, SAFETY TECH., http://www.safety 
technology.com/blog/why-women-carry-stun-guns/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2014) (stating that 
some women are reluctant to carry firearms). 
247. Volokh, Older Minors, supra note 21, at 449, 451. 
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adults, over the age of sixteen, there should be the ability to take a class 
and, with parental permission, to purchase and possess a non-lethal 
weapon for their own protection. 
To be sure, two concerns accompany the use of non-lethal weapons 
in vehicles: road rage and law enforcement stops.  The argument that 
increasing the ability to possess non-lethal weapons in cars should not 
deter law-abiding citizens from carrying their weapons.  Certainly, 
individuals who have road rage or are prone to anger can possess and 
carry within their homes, so long as they are not a felon or convicted of 
domestic abuse.  While imperfect, allowing those with road rage to have 
non-lethal weapons is certainly better than allowing them to have lethal 
weapons.  It would also be difficult, and possibly unconstitutional, to 
regulate someone who gets angry more easily than others.  Another 
legitimate concern among law enforcement is the possibility that non-
lethal weapons could be used against them at a traffic stop.  Law 
enforcement is aware that individuals can have weapons and should be 
on alert regardless because those who are willing to attack an officer do 
not follow the law.  Although officers could be victims of non-lethal 
weapons, their chances of survival are much greater than when being 
shot with a firearm.248  A final option that should be considered is a 
requirement that individuals carrying in a vehicle give notice when 
stopped by law enforcement.249  Again, though, this requirement seems 
useless because those willing to give notice are not typically going to 
attack a law enforcement officer. 
Giving higher protection to non-lethal weapons outside the home is 
sure to cause some controversy and is not without legitimate criticism.250  
However, the Heller Court confirmed the constitutional right of self-
defense in the home using handguns.251  The Court should take it a step 
further and give self-defense some teeth: Allow individuals to possess 
and lawfully use non-lethal weapons outside their home.  With increased 
protection for non-lethal weapons in the vehicle and outside the home, 
possible decreases in assault, rape, and other violent crimes may occur, 
while also potentially reducing the instances that lethal self-defense is 
 
248. See id. at 450. 
249. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.425f(2) (West 2012). 
250. See Kevin Reece, ACLU Urges Ban on Use of Tasers, Pepper Spray in Texas 
Schools, KHOU.COM (Feb. 13, 2014, 7:08 PM), http://www.khou.com/news/local/ACLU-
urges-ban-on-use-of-tasers-pepper-spray-in-Texas-schools-245463791.html; see also supra 
note 78. 
251. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
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used.  And, decreasing the number of guns in homes would certainly 
reduce the number of accidental deaths by children, a number alone that 
is always worth reducing.252 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Second Amendment should provide added protection for non-
lethal weapons; it should allow individuals to possess and carry non-
lethal weapons as a means to protect themselves.  Non-lethal weapons 
can reduce fatalities.253  Additionally, these weapons provide those who 
are uncomfortable with carrying a firearm the ability to defend 
themselves.  The Court should adjust its decisional rules based on 
common use and add whether the weapon is reasonably related to the 
purpose of self-defense and can encompass the risk of harm to the 
individual and those near and around the user.254  Further, the test 
should not focus on whether the military does or does not have or use a 
weapon because the test for reasonability is based on self-defense, not 
causing insurrection or creating a private militia.  This test should create 
incentives for individuals to defend themselves with non-lethal instead 
of lethal means. 
Increasing the possible use of non-lethal weapons means decreasing 
the number of guns purchased and used and ultimately decreasing the 
number of deaths by firearms.  One only needs to look at statistics by 
police departments nationwide to understand how effective non-lethal 
weapons can be in situations that could have quickly and easily turned 
deadly.255  Those who want individuals to have a right to self-defense 
should agree with added protection for non-lethal weapons, especially 
among those who are uncomfortable using lethal weapons for self-
defense.  Finally, the public at large will feel much more comfortable 
with individuals protecting themselves with non-lethal weapons than 
 
252. See CHILDREN’S DEF. FUND, PROTECT CHILDREN, NOT GUNS: OVERVIEW (2013), 
available at http://www.childrensdefense.org/child-research-data-publications/data/state-data-
repository/protect-children-not-guns-key-facts-2013.pdf; NEW YORKERS AGAINST GUN 
VIOLENCE, FACT SHEET: ACCIDENTAL SHOOTINGS (2013), available at http://nyagv.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/05/Accidental-Shootings-NYAGV.pdf; Michael Luo & Mike McIntire, 
Children and Guns: The Hidden Toll, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2013, at A1; Accidental Firearm: 
Fact Sheet, NAT’L MCH CTR. FOR CHILD DEATH R., http://www.childdeathreview.org/cause
saf.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2014). 
253. See Volokh, Older Minors, supra note 21, at 450. 
254. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 627. 
255. John M. MacDonald et al., The Effect of Less-Lethal Weapons on Injuries in Police 
Use-of-Force Events, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2268, 2270, 2272–73 (2009). 
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toting guns. 
Including non-lethal weapons in the definition of arms and providing 
a common sense approach to self-defense will benefit the public and the 
Court.  Adopting a decisional rule that results in a coherent analysis 
based on the purpose of self-defense makes sense; providing higher 
protections and more scrutiny for non-lethal weapons outside the home 
can provide a balance between the competing interests of gun restriction 
and increased right to self-defense under the Second Amendment. 
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